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Abstrat
This paper develops a strategi model of trade between two regions in whih,
depending on the relation among output, nanial resoures and transportation osts,
the adjustment of pries towards an equilibrium is studied. We derive onditions on
the relations among output and nanial resoures whih produe dierent types of
Nash equilibria. The paths obtained in the proess of onverging toward a steady
state for pries under disrete-time and ontinuous-time dynamis are derived and
ompared. It turns out that the results in the two ases dier substantially. Some of
the eets of random disturbanes on the prie dynamis in ontinuous time are also
studied.
1 Introdution
The present work develops a model of trade between two regions in whih, depending
on the relation among output, nanial resoures and transportation osts, the adjustment
of pries towards a steady state is studied. We assume that there is one type of traded good
and loal produers an supply only a xed amount of this traded good, whih annot be
stored for future onsumption. As usual, pries hange to balane supply and demand. In
the hosen setup, the evolution of pries aording to an exogenous rule is studied, starting
from pre-speied initial onditions. More speially, whenever there are unsold quantities
left, the prie is dereased proportionally and when there are loal nanial resoures un-
spent, the prie is inreased proportionally. This allows us to abstrat away from produer
behaviour and fous exlusively on onsumers' deisions. The representative onsumers in
the two regions seek to maximize their per-period utility in a strategi situation arising
∗
Faulty of Mathematis and Informatis, Soa University. E-mail: iordanovfmi.uni-soa.bg
†
Finanalytia. E-mail: stoyan.stoyanovnanalytia.om
‡
Faulty of Mathematis and Informatis, Soa University. E-mail: avassilevfmi.uni-soa.bg
1
from the need to ompete for sare resoures. We utilize the onept of Nash equilib-
rium to haraterize optimal behaviour in the game theoreti interation. This equilibrium
onept has the advantage of delivering onsistent preditions of the outomes of a game,
assuming that eah player takes into aount the other players' optimizing deisions (see
Ch.1 in [3℄ for a more detailed disussion of the onept).
Under the above setup we derive onditions on the relations among quantities produed
and nanial resoures, for whih dierent types of Nash equilibria arise. We also ompute
the paths obtained in the proess of pries onverging toward a steady state. In ertain
ases the laws governing prie dynamis in disrete time lead to a zero prie in one of the
regions, whih an be interpreted as a breakdown of eonomi ativity in the region. Suh
pathologies do not arise in the ase of ontinuous-time prie dynamis, where the ontin-
uous nature of the adjustment proess provides a natural balaning mehanism against
degenerate stationary points for pries. The stability properties of the stationary points in
the ontinuous-time ase are proved analytially and illustrated through the behaviour of
the phase trajetories of the system in the presene of stohasti disturbanes.
The paper is organized as follows. Setion 2 introdues the model and key notational
onventions. Setion 3 shows the existene and form of Nash equilibria for the model under
disussion. Setion 4 alulates and ompares the dynamis governing pries in disrete
time, while setion 5 presents the ounterpart analysis in the ontinuous-time ase. The
proofs of the results from setion 4 are provided in the appendix. Setion 6 ontains the
results of some simulations for the ontinuous-time ase with stohasti shoks. Partial
announements of the results reported in this paper appeared in [4℄ and [7℄.
2 The model
We onsider the onsumption deisions of two eonomi agents oupying distint spa-
tial loations, alled region I and II, respetively. The onsumer in region I (or, shortly,
onsumer I) exogenously reeives money inome Y1 > 0 in eah period. Similarly, the
onsumer in region II (onsumer II) reeives money inome Y2 > 0. For eah period t, in
region i, i = 1, 2, a xed quantity qi > 0 of a ertain good is supplied at a prie pi,t. The
onsumers plae orders for the desired quantities in eah region, observing their budget
onstraints and inurring symmetri transportation osts ρ > 0 per unit of shipment from
the foreign region. Eah onsumer attempts to maximize their total onsumption for
the urrent period. Consumers an be onsidered myopi in that they do not optimize
their onsumption over a speied time horizon but their deisions are onned only to the
urrent period.
In ases when total orders for the respetive region exeed the quantity available, the
following distribution rule is applied: rst, the order of the loal onsumer is exeuted to
the extent possible and then the remaining quantity, if any, is alloated to the onsumer
2
from the other region. We sometimes refer to this distribution sheme and its onsequenes
as loal dominane. It is lear then that the hoie of orders to be plaed has a strategi
element to it, sine the atual quantity reeived by the onsumer depends on the hoies
made by the ounterpart in the other region. The agents are assumed to have omplete
knowledge of all the relevant aspets of the situation under disussion.
More formally, for eah period t we model the above situation as a stati nonooperative
game of omplete information. Denote by α and β the orders plaed by onsumer I in
region I and II, respetively. In an analogous manner, γ and δ stand for the orders of
onsumer II in regions I and II, all orders obviously being nonnegative quantities. In
period t onsumer I's strategy spae S1 is determined by the budget onstraint and the
nonnegativity restritions on the orders:
(2.1) S1 = {(α, β) ∈ R
2|αp1,t + β(p2,t + ρ) ≤ Y1, α, β ≥ 0}.
Consumer II's strategy spae in period t is
(2.2) S2 = {(γ, δ) ∈ R
2|γ(p1,t + ρ) + δp2,t ≤ Y2, γ, δ ≥ 0}.
Below we adopt the shorthand p′1,t := p1,t+ρ and p
′
2,t := p2,t+ρ. We also omit the subsript
t whenever it is evident from the ontext or irrelevant.
The payo funtion for onsumer I is given by
P1(α, β, γ, δ) =min(α, q1) + min(β, q2 −min(δ, q2)) ≡
≡min(α, q1) + min(β, max(0, q2 − δ))
(2.3)
and that for onsumer II by
P2(α, β, γ, δ) =min(γ, q1 −min(α, q1)) + min(δ, q2) ≡
≡min(δ, q2) + min(γ, max(0, q1 − α)).
(2.4)
Any unspent fration of the urrent-period inome is assumed to perish and onse-
quently the aumulation of stoks of savings is not allowed in the model. Similarly, the
goods available eah period annot be stored for future onsumption. Let qconsi denote
the total amount onsumed in region i and Y resi stand for the part of the region i's in-
ome not spent in the other region. In other words, qcons1 := α0 + γ0, q
cons
2 := β0 + δ0,
Y res1,t := Y1 − p
′
2,tβ0 and Y
res
2,t := Y2 − p
′
1,tγ0.
There are two mutually exlusive situations leading to an adjustment in pries. First,
if the quantity available in the respetive region has not been entirely onsumed, pries are
adjusted downwards. In disrete time this is aptured by the equation
(2.5)
pi,t − pi,t+1
pi,t
=
qi − q
cons
i,t
qi
or pi,t+1qi = pi,tq
cons
i,t .
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Clearly, if qconsi = 0, then pi,t+1 = 0. Seond, if Y
res
i is not entirely exhausted in absorbing
loal supply, whih an be expressed in value terms as piqi, then the prie pi,t is adjusted
upwards to pi,t+1 to ensure residual inome exhaustion:
(2.6)
pi,t+1 − pi,t
pi,t
=
Y resi,t − pi,tqi
pi,tqi
or pi,t+1qi = Y
res
i,t .
Obviously the fration of Yi spent on the foreign market annot be attrated bak for
domesti onsumption if loal pries are inreasing. Later we formally prove the laim that
the two situations leading to prie adjustment annot our simultaneously. As usual, we
onsider pries in a steady state
1
if the rules given by equations (2.5) and (2.6) do not lead
to a hange in pries.
For the above model we are interested in two main questions. First, it would be desirable
to establish the existene of a Nash equilibrium for the one-period game and speify it in
losed form. Seond, one would like to be able to trae out the prie dynamis entailed by
a sequene of one-period games for a given set of initial onditions p1,0, p2,0, q1, q2, Y1, Y2
and ρ, and haraterize their properties.
3 Existene and form of equilibrium
In this setion we study the existene and properties of the most popular equilibrium
onept  that of Nash equilibrium  for the model speied above,for a xed time period
t. Our basi tool for establishing existene is a theorem [2, p. 72℄ asserting that at least
one Nash equilibrium exists for a game of omplete information for whih:
(a) the strategy spaes of all players are ompat and onvex subsets of R
m
;
(b) all payo funtions are dened, ontinuous and bounded over the strategy spae of
the game, and
() any payo funtion is quasionave in the player's own feasible strategies for a xed
strategy prole of the opponents.
We remind the reader that a funtion f : X → R is alled quasionave if for any x, y ∈ X
we have f(λx+ (1− λ)y) ≥ min{f(x), f(y)} for all λ ∈ (0, 1).
Properties (a) and (b) are immediately veried for our model when the pries pi are
positive. (If a prie is zero, eonomially plausible restritions are imposed on the model in
order to ensure that the above properties hold in this ase as well; see SR3.) To establish
property () note that the payo funtion for eah onsumer is separable in the onsumer's
1
Equivalently, we say that the prie adjustment proess has reahed a stationary point.
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orders and eah omponent of the sum in the payo is a onave funtion in the respetive
order. These observations entail the onavity and hene the quasionavity of the payos.
Sine all the hypotheses of the existene theorem are satised for our model, it has
at least one Nash equilibrium. We proeed to ompute the Nash equilibria for all possi-
ble ongurations of Y1, Y2, q1, q2, p1, p2 and ρ. To this end, we derive the best-reply
orrespondenes (see [2, pp. 69-75℄ ) for the two onsumers. We remind that these orre-
spondenes are dened as follows. Let us denote
u1(α, β) = P1(α, β, γ, δ)
for xed values of (γ, δ) ∈ S2 and
u2(γ, δ) = P2(α, β, γ, δ)
for xed values of (α, β) ∈ S1. Let (α¯(γ, δ), β¯(γ, δ)) be dened as
argmax
(α,β)∈S1
u1(α, β)
and, similarly, let (γ¯(α, β), δ¯(α, β)) be dened as
argmax
(γ,δ)∈S2
u2(γ, δ).
The (multivalued) orrespondene (α, β, γ, δ) 7→ (α¯, β¯, γ¯, δ¯) is alled best-reply orrespon-
dene for the problem, with r1(γ, δ) := (α¯, β¯) and r2(α, β) := (γ¯, δ¯) being the best-reply
funtions for onsumers I and II, respetively.
The derivation of the best-reply orrespondenes is straightforward and we omit the
details, presenting only the end-results. Table 3.1 presents the best-reply orrespondene
for onsumer I and Table 3.2 shows the best-reply orrespondene for onsumer II. For
simpliity in the tables we use α instead of α¯ et. for the equilibrium values. We note in
advane that in the ourse of the prie adjustment proess one of the pries an beome
zero, in whih ase the best reply orrespondenes take a dierent form (see Tables 3.3 and
3.4 below).
Several omments are in order with respet to the Tables 3.1 and 3.2. Beause of the
presene of the parameters (qi, Yi, pi, ρ), as well as the dierent feasible values of the xed
variables, the proedure for maximizing ui, i = 1, 2, an be deomposed into dierent ases
in a natural manner. For example, to nd maxu1 we get rid ofmax(0, q2−δ) by suessively
analyzing the two ases q2 ≤ δ and q2 > δ. The seond ase in turn deomposes into two
subases depending on whether the quantity q2− δ is smaller or greater than the maximal
feasible value Y1/p
′
2 of β. For α, whih we ompare with q1, the geometry of the feasible
set depends on, rst, the size of the dierene q1 − α0, where α0 is determined from the
ondition Y1 = p1α0 + p
′
2(q2 − δ), assuming q2 − δ ∈ (0, Y1/p
′
2) and, seond, by the ratio
5
A : Y1
p1
> q1 B :
Y1
p1
≤ q1
I. q2 − δ ≤ 0 q1 ≤ α ≤
Y1
p1
, 0 ≤ β ≤ Y1−p1α
p′
2
, SR1: α = q1, β = 0 α =
Y1
p1
, β = 0
A1 : 0 < q1 <
Y1−p
′
2(q2−δ)
p1
A2 :
Y1−p
′
2(q2−δ)
p1
≤ q1 <
Y1
p1
(1) : α = q1, β =
Y1−p1q1
p′
2
(1) : α = Y1
p1
, β = 0
II. q2 − δ ∈
(
0, Y1
p′2
]
q1 ≤ α ≤
Y1−p′2(q2−δ)
p1
(2) :
Y1−p′2(q2−δ)
p1
≤ α ≤ q1, (2) : α =
Y1−p′2β
p1
,
q2 − δ ≤ β ≤
Y1−p1α
p′
2
β = Y1−p1α
p′
2
, SR2: as in (1) 0 ≤ β ≤
p′
2
(q2−δ)
p1
, SR2: as in (1)
SR1: α = q1, β = q2 − δ (3) : α =
Y1−p′2(q2−δ)
p1
, (3) : α =
Y1−p′2(q2−δ)
p1
,
β = q2 − δ β = q2 − δ
(1) : α = q1, β =
Y1−p1q1
p′
2
(1) : α = Y1
p1
, β = 0
III. q2 − δ >
Y1
p′2
(2) : 0 ≤ α ≤ q1, β =
Y1−p1α
p′
2
, SR2: as in (1) (2) : 0 ≤ α ≤ Y1
p1
,
(3) : α = 0, β = Y1
p′
2
β = Y1−p1α
p′
2
, SR2: as in (1)
(3) : α = 0, β = Y1
p′
2
Shorthand notation used: (1) for p1 < p
′
2
, (2) for p1 = p
′
2
and (3) for p1 > p
′
2
Whenever the shorthand notation is not employed, the result should be taken to apply to eah of the three ases.
Table 3.1: Best-reply orrespondene for onsumer I.
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A : Y2
p2
> q2 B :
Y2
p2
≤ q2
I. q1 −α ≤ 0 0 ≤ γ ≤
Y2−p2q2
p′
1
, q2 ≤ δ ≤
Y2−p′1γ
p2
, SR1: γ = 0, δ = q2 γ = 0, δ =
Y2
p2
A1 : 0 < q2 <
Y2−p
′
1(q1−α)
p2
A2 :
Y2−p
′
1(q1−α)
p2
≤ q2 <
Y2
p2
(1) : γ = Y2−p2q2
p′
1
, δ = q2 (1) : γ = 0, δ =
Y2
p2
II. q1 −α ∈
(
0, Y2
p′1
]
q1 − α ≤ γ ≤
Y2−p2q2
p′
1
(2) : Y2−p2q2
p′
1
≤ γ ≤ q1 − α, (2) : 0 ≤ γ ≤ q1 − α,
q2 ≤ δ ≤
Y2−p′1γ
p2
δ =
Y2−p′1γ
p2
, SR2: as in (1) δ =
Y2−p′1γ
p2
, SR2: as in (1)
SR1: γ = q1 − α, δ = q2 (3) : γ = q1 − α, (3) : γ = q1 − α,
δ =
Y2−p′1γ
p2
δ =
Y2−p′1γ
p2
(1) : γ = Y2−p2q2
p′
1
, δ = q2 (1) : γ = 0, δ =
Y2
p2
III. q1 −α >
Y2
p′1
(2) : Y2−p2q2
p′
1
≤ γ ≤ Y2
p′
1
, δ =
Y2−p′1γ
p2
, SR2: as in (1) (2) : 0 ≤ γ ≤ Y2
p′
1
,
(3) : γ = Y2
p′
1
, δ = 0 δ =
Y2−p′1γ
p2
, SR2: as in (1)
(3) : γ = Y2
p′
1
, δ = 0
Shorthand notation used: (1) for p′
1
> p2, (2) for p
′
1
= p2 and (3) for p
′
1
< p2
Whenever the shorthand notation is not employed, the result should be taken to apply to eah of the three ases.
Table 3.2: Best-reply orrespondene for onsumer II.
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between the size of loal supply q1 and the maximum purhasing power of loal inome,
Y1/p1.
With the aid of the best-reply orrespondenes we an ompute the Nash equilibria for
the game as solutions to a system of equations. However, uniqueness is not guaranteed in
this model and we therefore have to resort to additional rules for equilibrium seletion in
order to hoose a single equilibrium. To this end we dene the following supplementary
seletion rules (SR), whih we deem logial from a pratial viewpoint:
SR1 (Expenditure minimization) For a set of Nash equilibria yielding the same utility
we selet the one minimizing the expenditures made. (The expenditures made by the
rst onsumer are p1α+ p
′
2β and those made by the seond onsumer are p
′
1γ+ p2δ.)
SR2 (Home bias) If more than one Nash equilibrium with the same utility an be ob-
tained with the same (minimal) expenditure, then we selet the one in whih on-
sumers reeive the maximum amount possible in their own region in preferene over
the foreign onsumer. (I.e. if for the rst market we have p1α + p
′
2β = const for
more than one point (α, β), we hoose the point with the largest value of α. We
proeed analogously for the seond market.)
SR3 (Free disposal) In the degenerate ase when a prie is equal to zero, we assume
that the atual amount bought is equal to the quantity available in the respetive
region.
SR3 points to a modiation in the best-reply orrespondenes required in the degen-
erate ase of a zero prie. If p1 = 0, i.e. p
′
1 = ρ, Table 3.2 should be modied into a table
idential to the former with p′1 = ρ and p2 > 0. Table 3.1 should be replaed by Table 3.3.
Subase (α¯, β¯) Seletion as per SR3
q2 − δ ≤ 0 q1 ≤ α (q1, 0)
0 ≤ β ≤ Y1
p′
2
0 < q2 − δ ≤
Y1
p′2
q1 ≤ α (q1, q2 − δ)
q2 − δ ≤ β ≤
Y1
p′
2
Y1
p′2
< q2 − δ q1 ≤ α
(
q1,
Y1
p′
2
)
β = Y1
p′
2
Table 3.3: Modiation of Table 3.1 for the degenerate ase p1 = 0.
If p2 = 0, i.e. p
′
2 = ρ, Table 3.1 should be replaed by an idential table with p
′
2 =
ρ, p1 = 0 and Table 3.2 should be replaed by Table 3.4.
In an analogous manner, by using SR1 and SR2 we an dispose of the multipliity of
solutions and arrive at a unique Nash equilibrium (α, β, γ, δ), as reeted in Tables 3.1 and
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Subase (γ¯, δ¯) Seletion as per SR3
q1 −α ≤ 0 0 ≤ γ ≤
Y2
p′
1
(0, q2)
q2 ≤ δ
0 < q1 −α ≤
Y2
p′1
q1 − α ≤ γ ≤
Y2
p′
1
(q1 − α, q2)
q2 ≤ δ
Y2
p′1
< q1 −α γ =
Y2
p′
1
(
Y2
p′
1
, q2
)
q2 ≤ δ
Table 3.4: Modiation of Table 3.2 for the degenerate ase p2 = 0.
3.2. The latter an be obtained as a solution of the system
(3.1)


α¯(γ, δ) = α
β¯(γ, δ) = β
γ¯(α, β) = γ
δ¯(α, β) = δ,
whih we derive expliitly in setion 4 and in the appendix.
4 Prie dynamis in the disrete-time ase
By denition, a steady state (point of equilibrium, p.e.) for the pries pi is the value
for whih onsumption (as given by the Nash equilibrium (α, β, γ, δ), NE for brevity) leads
to a omplete depletion of both the available quantities qi of the good and the nanial
resoures Yi. In other words, for qi and Yi exogenously given, we have α+γ = q1, β+δ = q2,
p1α + p
′
2β = Y1, p
′
1γ + p2δ = Y2. As a result pries are not adjusted for the next period
but retain their urrent values.
Naturally, if the initial values of pries are not a p.e., they are orreted prior to next
period's onsumption, as desribed above. The present setion aims to haraterize the
evolution of pries for all possible values of Yi (for xed qi, ρ > 0). For this purpose, it
is onvenient to present the results in Y1-Y2 spae. In aordane with the dierent ases
presented in Tables 3.1 and 3.2, we partition (by means of a set of lines and additional
restritions) the nonnegative quadrant of the plane into disjoint subsets of points
2 (Y˜1, Y˜2)
for whih a unique NE exists. Eah NE orresponding to an element of this partition is
presented as a losed-form expression involving the exogenous parameters. However, the
2
Formally, we should onsider the set of all possible ombinations of inomes for the two regions,
whih oinides with the nonnegative quadrant. A generi point in this set is denoted (Y˜1, Y˜2), while the
partiular inome pair under onsideration is (Y1, Y2). Therefore, the denitions of all the zones and lines
below should be presented in terms of Y˜1 and Y˜2. However, to simplify the notation we sometimes depart
from this onvention when no onfusion an arise (e.g. when dening the various zones) and write the
objets simply in terms of Y1 and Y2.
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partition itself (or, respetively, the set of lines), ruially depends on the values of pi.
After pries have been adjusted, the point (Y1, Y2) may turn out to be in another element
of the partition and, possibly, require another round of adjustment et. This evolution of
the pries will be detailed below, where we list the p.e.s attained (after a nite or innite
number of steps) for eah initial point.
The two main ases A and B in the tables dene the lines Y˜i = piqi. The lines divide
the nonnegative quadrant into four zones (see Figure 4.1). We label these zones in roman
numerals:
I) Y1 < p1q1, Y2 < p2q2
II) Y1 < p1q1, Y2 ≥ p2q2
III) Y1 ≥ p1q1, Y2 ≥ p2q2
IV) Y1 ≥ p1q1, Y2 < p2q2
Y˜1
Y˜2
ℓ1
III
II-1
II-3
II-2
E
IV-1
IV-2
ℓ4
ℓ3
ℓ2
I-1
I-2
I-3
p2q2
p′1q1
p′2q2 p1q1
Figure 4.1: Inome spae partition obtained for a xed parameter set.
The situations obtained in II) and IV) are symmetri with the roles of the onsumers
simply being swapped. In order to redue the number of ases explored, however, we shall
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break this symmetry and make the assumption
(4.1) p2q2 < p1q1
The restritions speied in the left-hand olumns of Tables 3.1 and 3.2 for maximal
values of the priority orders α and δ dene the lines
(4.2) ℓ1 : q1 =
Y˜1
p1
+
Y˜2
p′1
, i.e. p1q1 = Y˜1 + (p1/p
′
1)Y˜2,
(4.3) ℓ2 : q2 =
Y˜1
p′2
+
Y˜2
p2
, i.e. p2q2 = (p2/p
′
2)Y˜1 + Y˜2.
Y˜1
Y˜2
E
ℓ2
p2q2
p′2q2p1q1
Figure 4.2: The partition from Figure 4.1 when p′2q2 > p1q1.
In view of (4.1) there are three possible ases:
(4.4i) p′2q2 < p1q1 (see Figure 4.1),
(4.4ii) p′2q2 = p1q1 (the thik line in Figure 4.2),
(4.4iii) p′2q2 > p1q1 (see Figure 4.2).
The restritions dening the ases A1 and A2 in the two tables (again for maximal
values of the variables α and δ) an be represented geometrially by the lines
(4.5) ℓ3 : q1 =
Y˜1 − p
′
2
(
q2 −
Y˜2
p2
)
p1
, i.e.
p2
p′2
(p1q1 + p
′
2q2) =
p2
p′2
Y˜1 + Y˜2,
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(4.6) ℓ4 : q2 =
Y˜2 − p
′
1
(
q1 −
Y˜1
p1
)
p2
, i.e.
p1
p′1
(p′1q1 + p2q2) = Y˜1 +
p1
p′1
Y˜2
It is obvious that ℓ1 and ℓ4 are parallel, as are ℓ2 and ℓ3. The point E(p1q1, p2q2) lies
on ℓ3 and ℓ4. The role of these two lines is dierent in zones II and IV, as will be desribed
in more detail later (in zone II it is only line ℓ4 that matters and line ℓ3 matters only in
zone IV).
Remark 4.1. To failitate the veriation of the statements for the dierent ases, we
start by advaning a omment on ∆pt := p1,t − p2,t, denoted for brevity simply as ∆p.
Table 3.1 ontains the ases
(4.7)
1) ∆p < ρ,
2) ∆p = ρ,
3) ∆p > ρ.
In an analogous manner, Table 3.2 ontains the ases dened by the onditions
(4.8)
1) ∆p > −ρ,
2) ∆p = −ρ,
3) ∆p < −ρ.
By ombining ase i), i = 1, 2, 3, from (4.7) and ase j), j = 1, 2, 3, from (4.8), we
obtain the following subases (i, j):
(1, 1) ∆p ∈ (−ρ, ρ),
(1, 2) ∆p = −ρ,
(1, 3) ∆p < −ρ,
(2, 1) ∆p = ρ,
(3, 1) ∆p > ρ,
while subases (2, 2), (2, 3), (3, 2) and (3, 3) are rendered impossible by inompatible on-
straints. 
We proeed to desribe the evolution of pries for given initial values (p1,0, p2,0), for
whih nanial resoures (Y1, Y2) lie in zone III, i.e.
(4.9)
Y1
q1
≥ p1,0,
Y2
q2
≥ p2,0.
Let (α, β, γ, δ) be a NE for the hosen values of parameters Yi, qi, pi,0.
1) Suppose rst that q2−δ ≤ 0. Using Table 3.1, ase I-A (or 1-I-A for brevity), we nd
the possible range of values for (α, β). Then, by SR1 we determine α = q1, β = 0. Now
Table 3.2, ase I-A (2-I-A for brevity) shows that δ = q2 and, aording to SR1, γ = 0.
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We note that for the given hoie of the inequalities for the dierent ases in the tables,
from a formal standpoint sometimes there arises the need to analyse other ases as well.
(Case 1-I-B is an example in the present situations.) In fat, we ould dene the subases
in suh a manner as to have only losed sets. Our hoie, however, has the advantage of
simplifying the exposition, while leading to the same results.
Thus the NE is (q1, 0, 0, q2) and obviously the quantities supplied are depleted. If (4.9)
holds with equalities, the nanial resoures are also depleted and no adjustments in the
pries are neessary as the point E turns out to be a p.e. with
pi,t = pi,0 =
Yi
qi
, ∀t ≥ 0.
If for some i = 1, 2 we have
Yi
qi
> pi,0,
then aording to (2.6) the orresponding prie is adjusted upward to
(4.10) pi,1 =
Yi
qi
and no further adjustments are required. In other words, after one step pries stabilize at
the pries given by (4.10): pi,t = pi,1, ∀t ≥ 1.
Next, we hek for other NEs that may possibly be obtained in the ase given by (4.9).
2) Suppose now that 0 < q2 − δ ≤ Y1/p
′
2. Then using 1-II-A1 we get q1 − α ≤ 0. Now
2-I-A implies q2 − δ ≤ 0, whih is a ontradition under our hypothesis.
The formula in 1-II-A2 shows that q1 − α > 0 is possible only for
(4.11) p1,0 > p
′
2,0.
Then 2-II-A1 implies q2 − δ ≤ 0, whih is impossible, and for 2-II-A2 the only situation
ompatible with (4.11) is p′1,0 > p2,0, whih however produes δ = q2, a ontradition with
the assumption 0 < q2−δ ≤ Y1/p
′
2. It remains to hek whether there is an equilibrium for
whih q1−α > Y2/p
′
1. We see from 2-III-A that when p
′
1,0 ≥ p2,0, then q2−δ ≤ 0 is implied
again. The ase p′1,0 < p2,0 is inompatible with (4.11). This ompletes the analysis of the
ase 0 < q2 − δ ≤ Y1/p
′
2.
3) Let us now assume that
Y1
p′2
< q2 − δ.
Then from 1-III-A it follows that q1 − α > 0 only when p1,0 > p
′
2,0, sine α = 0 then. One
an verify as above that the values from 2-II-A1, 2-II-A2 and 2-III-A lead to a ontradition.
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In this ase the two eonomies operate in autarky and reah equilibrium without inter-
ating with eah other. This result is a natural onsequene of the fat that onsumers in
both eonomies have loal dominane (orders plaed by the loal onsumer are exeuted
rst), as well as suient nanial resoures to absorb the entire loal supply.
This proves
Proposition 4.2. For initial prie values pi,0 for whih the nanial resoures (Y1, Y2)
are in zone III, as dened in (4.9), the unique NE is (q1, 0, 0, q2) and after at most one
(upward) prie adjustment the equilibrium point E(p1,1q1, p2,1q2) is reahed.
In what follows, we refer to the equilibrium desribed in Proposition 4.2 as equilibrium
of type E. This is the type of equilibrium arising in the ase of auent eonomies that
trade in onditions of ample nanial resoure availability.
The analysis of the other ases is tehnially more ompliated and we list only the
nal results here, relegating skethes of the proofs to the appendix.
We also note that it is possible for more than one NE to arise depending on the rela-
tionship between pries and transportation osts.
Proposition 4.3. For initial pries pi,0 for whih (Y1, Y2) is in zone II,
(4.12) Y1 < p1,0q1, p2,0q2 ≤ Y2,
whih is divided into the following subzones:
i) Zone II-1:
(4.13)
{
Y1 < p1,0q1, p2,0q2 ≤ Y2,
q1 >
Y1
p1,0
+ Y2
p′
1,0
(stritly below ℓ1),
ii) Zone II-2:
(4.14)


Y1 < p1,0q1, p2,0q2 ≤ Y2,
q2 >
1
p2,0
[
Y2 − p
′
1,0
(
q1 −
Y1
p1,0
)]
(stritly below ℓ4),
Y1
p1,0
+ Y2
p′
1,0
≥ q1 (on or above ℓ1),
iii) Zone II-3:
(4.15)
{
Y1 < p1,0q1, p2,0q2 < Y2,
q2 ≤
1
p2,0
[
Y2 − p
′
1,0
(
q1 −
Y1
p1,0
)]
(on or above ℓ4),
we have respetively:
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a) in zone II-3 there exists a unique NE (Y1
p1
, 0, q1−
Y1
p1
, q2), for whih either (Y1, Y2) ∈ ℓ4,0,
whih is a p.e., or (Y1, Y2) is stritly above ℓ4,0 and we obtain (Y1, Y2) ∈ ℓ4,1 after one
upward adjustment in p2,0. (We refer to the p.e.s of this type as ℓ4-equilibria.)
b) in zone II-2 there exist two types of NE:
I) for ∆p < −ρ: NE
(
Y1
p1,0
, 0, q1 −
Y1
p1,0
,
Y2−p′1,0(q1−Y1/p1,0)
p2,0
)
,
II) for ∆p ≥ −ρ: NE
(
Y1
p1,0
, 0,
Y2−p2,0q2
p′
1,0
, q2
)
.
For the two types of NE the following prie adjustment patterns obtain:
- in ase I): 1) when (Y1, Y2) is stritly above ℓ1,0, after one downward adjustment step
in p2,0 we reah an ℓ4-equilibrium;
2) when (Y1, Y2) lies on ℓ1,0, the prie p2,0 is redued to p2,1 = 0 and we reah a degen-
erate ℓ1-equilibrium.
- in ase II): 1) when Y2 = p2,0q2, after one downward adjustment in p1,0 we reah a
p.e. of type E;
2) when Y2 > p2,0q2, let
k =
1
2q1
[√
(ρq1 − Y1 − Y2 + p2,0q2)2 + 4q1ρY1 − (ρq1 − Y1 − Y2 + p2,0q2)
]
and then, depending on whether
2.1) p2,0 − ρ ≤ k < p1,0
or
2.2) k < p2,0 − ρ < p1,0
we have, respetively, in:
2.1) an innite downward adjustment proess in p1,t for whih limt→∞ p1,t = k. (In this
ase the system of two eonomies tends to a degenerate ℓ4-equilibrium, where the limit
line is dened with the aid of the number k as ℓ4,∞ : Y˜1 +
k
k+ρ
Y˜2 = kq1 +
k
k+ρ
p2,0q2.)
2.2) after s downward adjustments of p1,t, t = 0, . . . , s, we reah the situation desribed
in ase I). (Here the number s ∈ N is determined by the ondition
p2,0 − ρ ∈
[
gs(p1,0), g
s−1(p1,0)
]
,
where g(x) = 1
q1
[
Y1 + (Y2 − p2,0q2)
x
x+ρ
]
.)
) in zone II-1 there are two types of NE:
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I) for ∆p < −ρ: NE
(
Y1
p1,0
, 0, Y2
p′
1,0
, 0
)
,
II) for ∆p ≥ −ρ: NE
(
Y1
p1,0
, 0,
Y2−p2,0q2
p′
1,0
, q2
)
.
For the two types of NE the following prie adjustment patterns obtain:
- in ase I) we have an innite downward adjustment proess in p1,t, under whih it
tends monotonially to
p1,∞ =
1
2q2
(
Y1 + Y2 − ρq1 +
√
(Y1 + Y2 − ρq1)2 + 4ρq1Y1
)
,
while p2,t = 0, ∀t ≥ 1. (In this ase the system of two eonomies tends to a degenerate ℓ1-
equilibrium, where the limit line is dened with the aid of the number p1,∞  see (A.2.13).)
- in ase II): see ase II) in b).
Proposition 4.3 deals with the interation of an auent eonomy with abundant nan-
ial resoures (region II) and a relatively poor one (region I). In our setup auene is
dened in terms of the nanial ability of onsumers to absorb the loal (and, potentially,
foreign) supply and is unrelated to the prodution side of the eonomy. This allows for
a rih variety of situations in zone II. For instane, with very high nanial resoures in
region II, heap output in region I and transportation osts that are not prohibitively
high, loal onsumers in region I buy all they an aord, so that onsumers from region
II an absorb the residual supply in region I, as well as the entire supply in their own
region, and still have inome unspent. This naturally leads to a prie inrease in the rih
region, while pries in the poorer region are unaeted by virtue of the priing mehanism
(see zone II-3 and ase a) above). As another example, if there is very abundant and
heap supply in region I (aounting for transportation osts in the ase of region II),
the nanial resoures of the two eonomies are entirely spent there and yet there remain
unrealized quantities, whih keeps driving down the prie in region I (zone II-1, ase )-I)).
At the same time, the market in region II beomes redundant and stops funtioning, with
a zero prie obtaining there and the entire amount of the good available being onsumed
by the loal onsumer for free (o the market).
Proposition 4.4. For initial pries pi,0 for whih (Y1, Y2) is in zone I,
(4.16) 0 < Y1 < p1,0q1, 0 < Y2 < p2,0q2,
whih is divided into the following subzones:
i) Zone I-1:
(4.17)
{
0 < Y1 < p1,0q1, 0 < Y2 < p2,0q2,
q1 ≤
Y1
p1,0
+ Y2
p′
1,0
(above or on ℓ1,0),
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ii) Zone I-2:
(4.18)


0 < Y1 < p1,0q1, 0 < Y2 < p2,0q2,
Y1
p1,0
+ Y2
p′
1,0
< q1 (stritly below ℓ1,0),
q2 ≤
Y1
p′
2,0
+ Y2
p2,0
(on or above ℓ2,0),
iii) Zone I-3:
(4.19)
{
0 < Y1 < p1,0q1, 0 < Y2 < p2,0q2,
q2 >
Y1
p′
2,0
+ Y2
p2,0
(stritly below ℓ2,0),
we have respetively:
a) in zone I-1 there exist three types of NE:
I) for ∆p ∈ [−ρ, ρ]: NE
(
Y1
p1,0
, 0, 0, Y2
p2,0
)
,
II) for ∆p < −ρ: NE
(
Y1
p1,0
, 0, q1 −
Y1
p1,0
,
Y2−p′1,0
„
q1−
Y1
p1,0
«
p2,0
)
,
III) for ∆p > ρ: NE
(
Y1−p′2,0
„
q2−
Y2
p2,0
«
p1,0
, q2 −
Y2
p2,0
, 0, Y2
p2,0
)
.
For the three types of NE the following prie adjustment patterns obtain:
- in ase I): after one downward prie adjustment we reah a type E equilibrium;
- in ase II): 1) when (Y1, Y2) is stritly above ℓ1, after one downward adjustment in
p2,0 we reah an ℓ4-equilibrium;
2) when (Y1, Y2) lies on ℓ1, we reah a degenerate ℓ1-equilibrium (p2,t = 0, ∀t ≥ 1);
- in ase III): after one downward adjustment in p1,0, we reah an ℓ3-equilibrium (see
Proposition 4.5);
b) in zone I-2 there exist three types of NE with the orresponding adjustment patterns:
I) for ∆p ∈ [−ρ, ρ]: see I) in zone I-1,
II) for ∆p < −ρ: see I) in zone II-1,
III) for ∆p > ρ: see III) in zone I-1.
) in zone I-3 there exist three types of NE with the orresponding adjustment patterns:
I) for ∆p ∈ [−ρ, ρ]: see I) in zone I-1,
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II) for ∆p < −ρ: see II) in zone I-2,
III) for ∆p > ρ: NE
(
0, Y1
p′
2,0
, 0, Y2
p2,0
)
, in whih ase after an innite downward adjust-
ment proess for p2,0, we reah a degenerate ℓ2-equilibrium.
Proposition 4.4 analyzes the interation of two regions that are relatively poor in terms
of initial wealth. Naturally, the low purhasing power of the onsumers in the two regions
results in deationary developments, while the exat distribution of onsumption aross
regions also depends on the size of transportation osts.
Proposition 4.5. For initial pries pi,0 for whih (Y1, Y2) is in zone IV,
(4.20) p1,0q1 ≤ Y1, 0 < Y2 < p2,0q2,
whih is divided into the following subzones:
i) Zone IV-1:
(4.21)


p1,0q1 ≤ Y1, 0 < Y2 < p2,0q2,
q1 ≤
Y1−p′2,0
„
q2−
Y2
p2,0
«
p1,0
(above or on ℓ3,0),
ii) Zone IV-2:
(4.22)


p1,0q1 ≤ Y1, 0 < Y2 < p2,0q2,
q1 >
Y1−p′2,0
„
q2−
Y2
p2,0
«
p1,0
(stritly below ℓ3,0),
we have respetively:
a) in zone IV-1 there exists a unique NE
(
q1, q2 −
Y2
p2,0
, 0, Y2
p2,0
)
, whih is symmetri (as
regards a hange of roles of the two eonomies) to the NE from zone II-3 (see Proposition
4.3, a)). The p.e. obtained in this ase will be referred to as an ℓ3-equilibrium.
b) in zone IV-2 there exist two types of NE:
I) for ∆p ≤ ρ: NE
(
q1,
Y1−p1,0q1
p′
2,0
, 0, Y2
p2,0
)
,
II) for ∆p > ρ: NE
(
Y1−p′2,0
„
q2−
Y2
p2,0
«
p1,0
, q2 −
Y2
p2,0
, 0, Y2
p2,0
)
,
whih are symmetri (in the above sense) to ases II) and I) for zone II-2 (see Proposition
4.3, b)).
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The results obtained for zone IV are symmetri to those for zone II as regards a hange
of roles of the two eonomies. In this ase, region I is the rih region and has the potential
to absorb a part of the supply in region II, while in the poorer region II onsumption
is satised out of loal supply only.
Proposition 4.6. For initial pries pi,0 for whih (Y1, Y2) is in zone I, dened by (4.16)
under the ondition (4.4iii) (see Figure A.6), whih is divided into the following subzones:
i) zone 1-1:
(4.23)


0 < Y1 < p1,0q1, 0 < Y2 < p2,0q2,
Y1
p1,0
+ Y2
p′
1,0
< q1 (stritly below ℓ1,0),
Y1
p′
2,0
+ Y2
p2,0
< q2 (stritly below ℓ2,0)
ii) zone 1-2:
(4.24)


0 < Y1 < p1,0q1, 0 < Y2 < p2,0q2,
Y1
p1,0
+ Y2
p′
1,0
≥ q1 (on or above ℓ1,0),
Y1
p′
2,0
+ Y2
p2,0
< q2 (stritly below ℓ2,0)
iii) zone 1-3:
(4.25)


0 < Y1 < p1,0q1, 0 < Y2 < p2,0q2,
Y1
p1,0
+ Y2
p′
1,0
< q1 (stritly below ℓ1,0),
Y1
p′
2,0
+ Y2
p2,0
≥ q2 (on or above ℓ2,0)
iv) zone 1-4:
(4.26)


0 < Y1 < p1,0q1, 0 < Y2 < p2,0q2,
Y1
p1,0
+ Y2
p′
1,0
≥ q1 (on or above ℓ1,0),
Y1
p′
2,0
+ Y2
p2,0
≥ q2 (on or above ℓ2,0)
we have respetively:
a) in zone 1-4 the initial NEs and the respetive prie adjustment proesses oinide with
those from zone I-1 (basi ase).
b) in zone 1-3 the initial NEs and the respetive prie adjustment proesses oinide re-
spetively:
- for ∆p ≥ −ρ - with those from zone I-1 (basi ase);
- for ∆p < −ρ - with those from zone I-2 (basi ase).
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) in zone 1-2 the initial NEs and the respetive prie adjustment proesses oinide re-
spetively:
- for ∆p ≤ ρ - with those from zone 1-4;
- for ∆p > ρ - with those from zone I-3 (basi ase).
d) in zone 1-1 the initial NEs and the respetive prie adjustment proesses oinide with
those from zone I-3 (basi ase).
Proposition 4.6 revisits the analysis of the interation of two relatively poor regions
in the speial ase when the onsumer in region I needs more nanial resoures in order
to buy the entire supply in region II than the resoures needed to entirely absorb loal
supply (ondition (4.4iii)). Unsurprisingly, the results obtained repliate the set of results
from the basi ase for zone I (Proposition 4.4). The dierenes that arise are a natural
onsequene of the dierent partitioning of zone 1 into subzones due to the fat that the
line ℓ2 now intersets the line ℓ1 at the point G (see Figure A.6).
We onlude setion 4 by formulating Theorem 4.7, whih summarizes the results from
Propositions 4.2-4.6. Sine we have already stated the nal results for the prie dynamis
entailed by the model in disrete time, stritly aounting for the various ombinations
of parameters possible, we now state the theorem in a way that emphasizes the eonomi
interpretation of the results. For this purpose we introdue appropriate terms that help
illustrate the laims (i = 1, 2):
• RLSi := qi  real loal supply in the market in region i;
• NLSi := piqi  nominal loal supply in region i (valued at loal pries);
• NFRi := Yi  nominal nanial resoures in region i;
• TRFR1 :=
Y1
p1
+ Y2
p′
1
 total real nanial resoures, valued at region I's pries;
• TRFR2 :=
Y1
p′
2
+ Y2
p2
 total real nanial resoures, valued at region II's pries;
• T1 :=
p2q2
p′
1
+ q1  total real supply in region I;
• T2 :=
p1q1
p′
2
+ q2  total real supply in region II.
With the help of the above quantities we an provide equivalent formulations for the
terms used in the dierent propositions:


above
on
below

 ℓi ⇔ RLSi


<
=
>

TRFRi, i = 1, 2,
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

above
on
below

 ℓ3 ⇔ T2


<
=
>

TRFR2,

above
on
below

 ℓ4 ⇔ T1


<
=
>

TRFR1.
Theorem 4.7. I) When:
1) NFRi > NLSi, i = 1, 2 or
2) NFRi ≤ NLSi, i = 1, 2 and at the same time ∆p ∈ [−ρ, ρ],
then with a one-time inrease (ase 1)) or derease (ase 2)) in pries we reah an equi-
librium of type E (see zones I and III).
II) When NFR for one of the eonomies is less than the respetive NLS but at the
same time TRFR valued at the loal prie for this eonomy is not less than T , then we
reah an ℓ3-equilibrium or ℓ4-equilibrium after a one-time inrease of the prie in the other
eonomy (see zones IV-1 and II-3).
III-a) When the seond requirement in II) is violated (i.e. T > TRFR) but we have
i) RLS < TRFR < T and
ii) the loal prie, adjusted for transportation osts, is stritly smaller than the prie on
the other market,
then the same result as in ase II) obtains through a derease of the latter prie. (See zone
II-3 for the ℓ4-equilibrium, and zones IV-2 and I-1 for the ℓ3-equilibria).
III-b) When ondition ii) in III-a) is replaed by the opposite ondition, there are two
situations:
III-b-1) The dierene between the prie in the other region and the transportation osts
does not exeed a ritial threshold (the number k in Proposition 4.3 for zone II-2);
III-b-2) The above dierene is stritly greater than the ritial threshold.
Then, in ase III-b-1) the system of the two eonomies tends to a degenerate ℓ4-
equilibrium through an innite adjustment proess and in ase III-b-2) after a nite number
of steps a regular ℓ4-equilibrium is reahed.
IV) When in eonomy i we have RLSi = TRFRi, we reah a degenerate equilibrium
in whih the prie in the other eonomy immediately falls to zero (see the degenerate ℓ1-
equilibrium in the ase in Figure 4.1 when (4.4i) holds).
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V) When for eonomy i we have TRFRi < qi and ondition ii) from III-a) holds, then
the two eonomies tend to a degenerate equilibrium through a gradual derease of the prie
whih does not automatially beome zero (see zones II-1, I-2 and I-3 for the ℓ1-equilibria,
and zone I-3 for the ℓ2-equilibrium).
5 Prie dynamis in the ontinuous-time ase
This setion investigates the ounterpart of the model in setion 2 under ontinuous-
time prie dynamis. Similarly to the setup desribed above, we formulate a prie adjust-
ment rule on the basis of the residual inome left unspent or the quantity of the good
not onsumed at eah instant t. This takes the form of a system of ordinary dieren-
tial equations, whose properties are studied and ompared to those of their disrete time
ounterpart (2.5)-(2.6).
The problem setup and notation employed are idential to the ones in setion 2. The
stati games played and all their properties are the same as before, with the obvious
dierene that the games are indexed by a set with the ardinality of the ontinuum. To
distinguish the ontinuous-time nature of the present setup, we write the two pries as
pi(t), i = 1, 2.
Thus, at time t onsumer I's strategy spae S1 is determined by the budget onstraint
and the nonnegativity restritions on the orders:
(5.1) S1 = {(α, β) ∈ R
2
+ | αp1(t) + β(p2(t) + ρ) ≤ Y1}.
Consumer II's strategy spae in period t is
(5.2) S2 = {(γ, δ) ∈ R
2
+ | γ(p1(t) + ρ) + δp2(t) ≤ Y2}.
As before, we adopt the shorthand p′1(t) := p1(t) + ρ and p
′
2(t) := p2(t) + ρ. We also omit
the argument t whenever it is evident from the ontext or irrelevant.
The payo (or utility) funtions for onsumers I and II are denoted U1(α, β, γ, δ) and
U2(α, β, γ, δ), and are dened as in (2.3) and (2.4). Apart from the familiar notation q
cons
i
and Y resi , i = 1, 2, we also dene the part of the instantaneous inome ow for onsumer
I that has been spent as Y cons1 := p1(t)α0 + p
′
2(t)β0 ≤ Y1. The respetive variable for
onsumer II is Y cons2 := p
′
1(t)γ0 + p2(t)δ0 ≤ Y2.
We rst establish that at any moment in time we an have exatly one of the two
situations desribed in the previous paragraph (Lemma 5.2). We then show that Y resi −
piqi = Yi − Y
cons
i (Corollary 5.3).
Lemma 5.1. Let (α0, β0, γ0, δ0) be a Nash equilibrium as above. Then
(5.3) α0 + γ0 ≤ q1 and β0 + δ0 ≤ q2.
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Proof. We rst observe that
(5.4) α0 ≤ q1 and δ0 ≤ q2.
To see this, assume, for instane, that α0 > q1. The latter implies U1(α0, β0, γ0, δ0) =
U1(q1, β0, γ0, δ0). When p1 > 0, this ontradits SR1. If p1 = 0, the laim follows from
SR3.
Taking into aount (5.4), we obtain
U1(α0, β0, γ0, δ0) =α0 +min(β0, q2 − δ0)
U2(α0, β0, γ0, δ0) =min(γ0, q1 − α0) + δ0.
Now the rst part in (5.3) beomes obvious, as the assumption γ0 > q1 − α0 ontradits
SR1, applied to U2. 
Lemma 5.2. It is impossible to have simultaneously
(5.5) qconsi < qi and Y
res
i > piqi, i = 1, 2.
Proof. Fix, for instane, i = 1 and suppose the onverse is true. Then
α0 + γ0 = q
cons
1 < q1 ⇒ q1 − α0 − γ0 > 0.
Keeping β0, γ0 and δ0 xed, we inrease α0 to α¯ := α0 + ε, ε ∈ (0, q1 − α0 − γ0). This
implies that
α0 + ε < q1 − γ0 ⇒ p1(α0 + ε) < p1q1 − p1γ0 ≤ p1q1 < Y
res
1 ,
whih establishes the feasibility of (α¯, β0, γ0, δ0). Then U1(α¯, β0, γ0, δ0) > U1(α0, β0, γ0, δ0),
whih ontradits the assumption that (α0, β0, γ0, δ0) is a Nash equilibrium. 
Corollary 5.3. For onsumer I exatly one of the following alternatives is possible (with
analogous results holding for onsumer II):
i) α0 = q1 and then Y
res
1 − p1q1 = Y1 − Y
cons
1 ;
ii) α0 < q1 and then Y1 = Y
cons
1 .
Proof. Sine i) is obvious, we take up the ase α0 < q1. By Lemma 5.1 we have δ0 ≤ q2
and we analyse two ases:
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I) If δ0 = q2, then β0 = 0. By denition (α0, β0) is the solution to
max
α,β
U1(α, β, γ0, δ0) s.t.
p1α + p
′
2β ≤ Y1
α, β ≥ 0
and sine α0 < q1, we an fous on nding maxα,β[α +min(β, 0)] = maxα[α] subjet
to α ≤ q1. Two subases are possible:
a)
Y1
p1
≤ q1;
b) q1 <
Y1
p1
.
For subase a) it is evident that α0 =
Y1
p1
and, ombined with β0 = 0, this gives us
Y cons1 = p1α0 + p
′
2β0 = Y1, as asserted. For subase b) there is no solution.
II) If δ0 < q2, then Lemma 5.1 implies β0 ≤ q2 − δ0. Again two subases are possible:
a)
Y1
p′
2
≤ q2 − δ0;
b) q2 − δ0 <
Y1
p′
2
.
In maximizing U1(α, β, γ, δ) over {(α, β)|α, β ≥ 0, p1α + p
′
2β ≤ Y1} we an restrit
our attention to the intersetion of this feasible set with the set dened by α ≤ q1
and β ≤ q2 − δ0, as the extremum (α0, β0) satises these onstraints as well. Then
it is easily seen that either the maximum is attained at a point along the budget
onstraint and therefore Y cons1 = p1α0 + p
′
2β0 = Y1, or (depending on the magnitudes
of q1 and Y1/p1, and the slope of the budget onstraint line) we get α0 = q1, whih
violates the initial assumptions. 
Remark 5.4. The laim in Corollary 5.3 an also be established through diret veriation
by using the spei form of the NEs (see setion 3).
The prie adjustment rule in disrete time is of the form (see (2.5) and (2.6))
(5.6)
pt+1 − pt
pt
= A(t)× 1,
i.e. A(t) is related to the hange in the prie for one time period. If we assume that
in the ontinuous-time ase A(t) does not hange substantially over a short time interval
[t, t+∆t], the ounterpart of the disrete-time adjustment rule will be
∆p(t)
p(t)
= A(t)∆t, ∆p(t) := p(t+∆t)− p(t).
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Taking the limit in the above as ∆t→ 0, we obtain the dierential equation
p˙(t)
p(t)
= A(t).
More preisely, the ontinuous-time ounterpart of the adjustment rules dened in (2.5)
and (2.6) is given by the dierential equation system
(5.7)
p˙i
pi
= −
qi − q
cons
i
qi
+
Yi − Y
cons
i
piqi
, i = 1, 2.
For brevity we will employ the shorthand Qi for the right-hand side of equation (5.7). By
virtue of the results established above at most one of the terms on the right-hand side
of (5.7) will be nonzero. To allow for the possibility of the pries taking zero values, we
rewrite the above system as
(5.8) p˙i = Qipi, i = 1, 2.
For the problem at hand it is more onvenient to swith to a p1-p2 oordinate system
instead of the Y1-Y2 system used so far.
We obtain the following results:
a) The lines Yi = piqi are transformed into the lines pi =
Y1
qi
, i = 1, 2, and we have the
the onditions
Yi


<
=
>

 piqi ⇐⇒ pi


>
=
<

 Yiqi .
b) The equation
ℓ1 : q1 =
Y1
p1
+
Y2
p′1
an be written in equivalent form as
q1p
2
1 + (q1ρ− Y1 − Y2)p1 − Y1ρ = 0
and, in view of the fat that p1 is a prie, we an take only the positive root
p∗1 =
Y1 + Y2 − ρq1 +
√
(Y1 + Y2 − ρq1)2 + 4ρq1Y1
2q1
and write the last equation as
p1 = p
∗
1.
We also have
(Y1, Y2) is


above
on
below

 ℓ1 ⇐⇒ p1


<
=
>

 p∗1.
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) Analogously, the line
ℓ2 : q2 =
Y1
p′2
+
Y2
p2
is transformed into
p2 = p
∗
2,
where
p∗2 =
Y1 + Y2 − ρq2 +
√
(Y1 + Y2 − ρq2)2 + 4ρq2Y2
2q2
.
Moreover,
(Y1, Y2) is


above
on
below

 ℓ2 ⇐⇒ p2


<
=
>

 p∗2.
Note that
(5.9) p∗1 >
Y1
q1
and p∗2 >
Y2
q2
.
For instane, it is easily veried that the rst inequality in (5.9) is equivalent to√
(Y1 + Y2 − ρq1)2 + 4ρq1Y1 > Y1 − Y2 + ρq1.
It is evidently true when the right-hand side is non-positive. When the right-hand
side is positive, we an square the inequality and hek that it is equivalent to Y2 > 0.
d) Solving the equation for ℓ3 with respet to p1 (for xed Yi, qi), we obtain the hyperbola
p1 =
1
q1
(
Y1 + Y2 − ρq2 − p2q2 +
ρ
p2
Y2
)
=: h3(p2).
We note that
d1) (Y1, Y2) is


above
on
below

 ℓ3 ⇐⇒ p1


<
=
>

h3(p2) ⇐⇒
⇐⇒ (p1, p2) is


below
on
above

 the graph of p1 = h3(p2).
d2) The hyperbola p1 = h3(p2) rosses the p2 axis at the point (0, p
∗
2) and therefore has
the form shown in Figure 5.1.
e) In a similar manner, ℓ4 is transformed into the hyperbola
p2 =
1
q2
(
Y1 + Y2 − ρq1 − p1q1 +
ρ
p1
Y1
)
=: h4(p1).
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p2
p1
p∗2
Y2
q2
Figure 5.1: The hyperbola p1 = h3(p2).
Then,
(Y1, Y2) is


above
on
below

 ℓ4 ⇐⇒ p2


<
=
>

h4(p1) ⇐⇒
⇐⇒ (p1, p2) is


below
on
above

 the graph of p2 = h4(p1).
Moreover, the hyperbola p2 = h4(p1) rosses the p1 axis at the point (p
∗
1, 0) and
therefore has the form shown in Figure 5.2.
Thus, we obtain Figure 5.3, whih is the equivalent of Figure 4.1 in p1-p2 spae.
For onveniene we list the form of the NEs as desribed in the disrete-time ase (see
Tables 5.1 and 5.2).
Now we an ompute the right-hand sides piQi of equations (5.8), whih are shown in
Table 5.3.
The results in Table 5.3 allow us to nd the diretion of the phase ows shown in Figures
5.3 and 5.4. It is evident that the position of the lines p2 = p1 + ρ and p2 = p1− ρ relative
to the partition in Figure 5.3 plays a speial role for the type of phase portrait obtained.
For instane, when the point E˜ lies in the set {(p1, p2)| p1 − ρ < p2 < p1 + ρ}, we have a
phase portrait of the type shown in Fig. 5.3. When E˜ is above the set {(p1, p2)| p1 − ρ <
p2 < p1 + ρ}, the situation shown in Figure 5.4 obtains. The reader an easily produe
phase portraits of this kind for various assumptions about Y1, Y2, q1, q2 and ρ with the help
of Table 5.3.
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Zone Prie relation Nash equilibrium (α0, β0, γ0, δ0)
III - (q1, 0, 0, q2)
II-3 -
(
Y1
p1
, 0, q1 −
Y1
p1
, q2
)
II-2 ∆p ≥ −ρ
(
Y1
p1
, 0, Y2−p2q2
p′
1
, q2
)
∆p < −ρ
(
Y1
p1
, 0, q1 −
Y1
p1
,
Y2−p′1
“
q1−
Y1
p1
”
p2
)
II-1 ∆p ≥ −ρ
(
Y1
p1
, 0, Y2−p2q2
p′
1
, q2
)
∆p < −ρ
(
Y1
p1
, 0, Y2
p′
1
, 0
)
I-1 ∆p ∈ [−ρ, ρ]
(
Y1
p1
, 0, 0, Y2
p2
)
∆p < −ρ
(
Y1
p1
, 0, q1 −
Y1
p1
,
Y2−p′1
“
q1−
Y1
p1
”
p2
)
∆p > ρ
(
Y1−p′2
“
q2−
Y2
p2
”
p1
, q2 −
Y2
p2
, 0, Y2
p2
)
I-2 ∆p ∈ [−ρ, ρ]
(
Y1
p1
, 0, 0, Y2
p2
)
∆p < −ρ
(
Y1
p1
, 0, Y2
p′
1
, 0
)
∆p > ρ
(
Y1−p′2
“
q2−
Y2
p2
”
p1
, q2 −
Y2
p2
, 0, Y2
p2
)
I-3 ∆p ∈ [−ρ, ρ]
(
Y1
p1
, 0, 0, Y2
p2
)
∆p < −ρ
(
Y1
p1
, 0, Y2
p′
1
, 0
)
∆p > ρ
(
0, Y1
p′
2
, 0, Y2
p2
)
IV-1 -
(
q1, q2 −
Y2
p2
, 0, Y2
p2
)
IV-2 ∆p ≤ ρ
(
q1,
Y1−p1q1
p′
2
, 0, Y2
p2
)
∆p > ρ
(
Y1−p′2
“
q2−
Y2
p2
”
p1
, q2 −
Y2
p2
, 0, Y2
p2
)
Table 5.1: Nash equilibria for the ase p′2q2 < p1q1.
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Zone Prie relation Nash equilibrium (α0, β0, γ0, δ0)
III - (q1, 0, 0, q2)
II-3 -
(
Y1
p1
, 0, q1 −
Y1
p1
, q2
)
II-2 ∆p ≥ −ρ
(
Y1
p1
, 0, Y2−p2q2
p′
1
, q2
)
∆p < −ρ
(
Y1
p1
, 0, q1 −
Y1
p1
,
Y2−p′1
“
q1−
Y1
p1
”
p2
)
II-1 ∆p ≥ −ρ
(
Y1
p1
, 0, Y2−p2q2
p′
1
, q2
)
∆p < −ρ
(
Y1
p1
, 0, Y2
p′
1
, 0
)
1-1 ∆p ∈ [−ρ, ρ]
(
Y1
p1
, 0, 0, Y2
p2
)
∆p < −ρ
(
Y1
p1
, 0, Y2
p′
1
, 0
)
∆p > ρ
(
0, Y1
p′
2
, 0, Y2
p2
)
1-2 ∆p ∈ [−ρ, ρ]
(
Y1
p1
, 0, 0, Y2
p2
)
∆p < −ρ
(
Y1
p1
, 0, q1 −
Y1
p1
,
Y2−p′1
“
q1−
Y1
p1
”
p2
)
∆p > ρ
(
0, Y1
p′
2
, 0, Y2
p2
)
1-3 ∆p ∈ [−ρ, ρ]
(
Y1
p1
, 0, 0, Y2
p2
)
∆p < −ρ
(
Y1
p1
, 0, Y2
p′
1
, 0
)
∆p > ρ
(
Y1−p′2
“
q2−
Y2
p2
”
p1
, q2 −
Y2
p2
, 0, Y2
p2
)
1-4 ∆p ∈ [−ρ, ρ]
(
Y1
p1
, 0, 0, Y2
p2
)
∆p < −ρ
(
Y1
p1
, 0, q1 −
Y1
p1
,
Y2−p′1
“
q1−
Y1
p1
”
p2
)
∆p > ρ
(
Y1−p′2
“
q2−
Y2
p2
”
p1
, q2 −
Y2
p2
, 0, Y2
p2
)
IV-1 -
(
q1, q2 −
Y2
p2
, 0, Y2
p2
)
IV-2 ∆p ≤ ρ
(
q1,
Y1−p1q1
p′
2
, 0, Y2
p2
)
∆p > ρ
(
Y1−p′2
“
q2−
Y2
p2
”
p1
, q2 −
Y2
p2
, 0, Y2
p2
)
Table 5.2: Nash equilibria for the ase p′2q2 > p1q1.
29
Zone p-ρ relation p1Q1 Sign p2Q2 Sign
III -
Y1−p1q1
q1
+
Y2−p2q2
q2
+
II-3 - 0
Y2−p2q2−p′1
“
q1−
Y1
p1
”
q2
+ below h4
II-2 ∆p ≥ −ρ Y1q1 +
(Y2−p2q2)p1
q1p′1
− p1 - above h4 0
∆p < −ρ 0
Y2−p′1
“
q1−
Y1
p1
”
q2
− p2 - above h4
II-1 ∆p ≥ −ρ Y1q1 +
(Y2−p2q2)p1
q1p′1
− p1 - above h4 0
∆p < −ρ
(
Y1
p1
+ Y2
p′
1
− q1
)
p1
q1
- for p1 > p
∗
1 −p2 -
I-1 ∆p ∈ [−ρ, ρ] Y1−p1q1q1 -
Y2−p2q2
q2
-
∆p < −ρ 0
Y2−p′1
“
q1−
Y1
p1
”
q2
− p2 - above h4
∆p > ρ
Y1−p′2
“
q2−
Y2
p2
”
q1
− p1 - above h3 0
I-2 ∆p ∈ [−ρ, ρ] Y1−p1q1q1 -
Y2−p2q2
q2
-
∆p < −ρ
(
Y1
p1
+ Y2p′
1
− q1
)
p1
q1
- for p1 > p
∗
1 −p2 -
∆p > ρ
Y1−p′2
“
q2−
Y2
p2
”
q1
− p1 - above h3 0
I-3 ∆p ∈ [−ρ, ρ] Y1−p1q1q1 -
Y2−p2q2
q2
-
∆p < −ρ
(
Y1
p1
+ Y2p′
1
− q1
)
p1
q1
- for p1 > p
∗
1 −p2 -
∆p > ρ −p1 -
(
Y1
p′
2
+ Y2p2 − q2
)
p2
q2
- for p2 > p
∗
2
IV-1 -
Y1−p1q1−p′2
“
q2−
Y2
p2
”
q1
+ below h3 0
IV-2 ∆p ≤ ρ 0 (Y1−p1q1)p2q2p′2
+ Y2q2 − p2 - above h3
∆p > ρ
Y1−p′2
“
q2−
Y2
p2
”
q1
− p1 - above h3 0
Table 5.3: Right-hand side expressions and signs for equations (5.8).
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p2
p1p∗1
Y1
q1
Figure 5.2: The hyperbola p2 = h4(p1).
Table 5.3 shows that, depending on the transportation osts ρ and the oordinates(
Y1
q1
, Y2
q2
)
of point E˜ (or, equivalently, depending on the position of this point with respet
to the set {(p1, p2)| p1 − ρ < p2 < p1 + ρ}), it is possible to have disontinuities in the
right-hand side of (5.8). For example, in zone IV-2 it is possible to have a disontinuity
along the line p2 = p1−ρ, provided that E˜ lies below it, i.e.
Y2
q2
< Y1
q1
−ρ. In these ases we
obtain the situation in [1, pp. 41-42℄, where the phase trajetory, after hitting the surfae
of the disontinuity, stays on it
3
.
The only equilibrium points for the system (5.8) are those on the hyperbolae h3 and h4,
inluding point E˜ (see Figure 5.3). The diretion of the phase ow as presented in the gure
makes it lear that the xed points we onsider are Lyapunov stable but not asymptotially
stable. Let us take, for example, a point (p01, p
0
2) on the graph of h3, assuming that E˜ lies
above the line p2 = p1 − ρ (i.e. ∆p < ρ). In zone IV-1 the system takes the form
(5.10)
{
p˙1 =
1
q1
(
Y1 + Y2 − ρq2 +
ρ
p2
Y2 − p2q2 − p1q1
)
p˙2 = 0
Fix a neighborhood V of (p01, p
0
2) and let (p¯
0
1, p¯
0
2) be a point in the intersetion of V and
zone IV-1 (see Figure 5.5). In other words, this point is below the hyperbola p1 = h3(p2).
Then the salar
C ≡
1
q1
(
Y1 + Y2 − ρq2 +
ρ
p¯02
Y2 − p¯
0
2q2
)
− p¯01 = h3(p¯
0
2)− p¯
0
1 > 0
3
For more details see [1, p. 64 and pp. 82-83℄
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p2
p1p
∗
1
Y1
q1
Y2
q2
p∗2
III
IV-1
IV-2
II-3
II-2
II-1
I-1
I-2
I-3
p2 = p1 + ρ
p2 = p1 − ρ
h3
h4
E˜
Figure 5.3: The partition from Figure 4.1 in p1-p2 spae.
an be made arbitrarily small if we shrink V in an appropriate manner, sine h3(·) is
ontinuous and h3(p
0
2)− p
0
1 = 0.
The seond equation in (5.10) implies p2 = p¯
0
2 and therefore the rst equation takes the
form
p˙1 = −p1 + C + p¯
0
1, p1(0) = p¯
0
1,
the orresponding solution being
p1(t) = −Ce
−t + C + p¯01.
For any t > 0 the distane between (p1(t), p2(t)) and (p
0
1, p
0
2) is bounded above by
2C + |p¯01 − p
0
1| + |p¯
0
2 − p
0
2|. As t → +∞, the solution (p1(t), p2(t)) tends to (C + p¯
0
1, p¯
0
2) =
(h3(p¯
0
2), p¯
0
2) 6= (h3(p
0
2), p
0
2) = (p
0
1, p
0
2), exept in the speial ase when p¯
0
2 = p
0
2.
In zone IV-2 (i.e. above the hyperbola h3) and under the ondition ∆p ≤ ρ we have
the system
(5.11)
{
p˙1 = 0
p˙2 =
1
q2
(Y1 + Y2 − p1q1 + ρq2) + ρ
p1q1−Y1
q2
. 1
p′
2
− p′2 ≡ H˜(p1, p2).
Fix a point (p¯01, p¯
0
2) in the intersetion of V and zone IV-2. In view of the rst equation
in (5.11), p1 = p¯
0
1. Let (p¯
0
1, p¯
0
2) be a point on the hyperbola h3, i.e. H˜(p¯
0
1, p¯
0
2) = 0 (see
32
p2
p1p
∗
1
Y1
q1
Y2
q2
p∗2
III
IV-1
IV-2
II-3
II-2
II-1
I-1
I-2
I-3
p2 = p1 + ρ
p2 = p1 − ρ
h3
h4
E˜
Figure 5.4: The partition from Figure 4.1 in p1-p2 spae for a dierent position of the point
E˜ with respet to the lines p2 = p1 ± ρ.
Figure 5.6). Then the seond equation in (5.11) beomes
p˙2 = H˜(p¯
0
1, p2)− H˜(p¯
0
1, p¯2).
We note that the derivative
∂
∂p2
H˜(p1, p2) = −
[
ρ(p1q1 − Y1)
q2p′ 22
+ 1
]
is stritly negative in a small neighborhood of (p01, p
0
2). Indeed, as (p
0
1, p
0
2) lies on the graph
of h3, we have
p01q1 + p
0′
2 q2 − Y1 =
p0′2
p02
Y2 > 0
and, onsequently,
ρ
p0′2
(Y1 − p
0
1q1) < Y1 − p
0
1q1 < q2p
0′
2 , i.e.
∂
∂p2
H˜(p01, p
0
2) < 0.
The laim follows from the latter observation as
∂
∂p2
H˜(p1, p2) is ontinuous. If we further
ontrat the neighborhood V so as to ensure that ∂
∂p2
H˜(p1, p2) < 0 in it, the equation
under onsideration beomes
p˙2(t) = (p2(t)− p¯
0
2).
1∫
0
∂
∂p2
H˜(p¯01, p¯
0
2 + s(p2(t)− p¯
0
2))ds.
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0
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Figure 5.5: A neighborhood of the point (p01, p
0
2) on h3 for (p¯
0
1, p¯
0
2) in zone IV-1.
(p¯01, p¯
0
2)
(p01, p
0
2)
h3
IV-2
(p¯01, p¯
0
2)
p2
p1
Figure 5.6: A neighborhood of the point (p01, p
0
2) on h3 for (p¯
0
1, p¯
0
2) in zone IV-2.
Then
d
dt
(p2(t)− p¯
0
2)
2 = 2(p2(t)− p¯
0
2)p˙2 = 2(p2(t)− p¯
0
2)
2
1∫
0
∂
∂p2
H˜(p¯01, p¯
0
2 + s(p2(t)− p¯
0
2))ds < 0.
In words, for (p¯01, p¯
0
2) ∈ V , the expression |(p2(t) − p¯
0
2)| does not inrease as t → +∞ and
stability is established sine |(p02 − p¯
0
2)| is small.
One obtains analogous results for the points on the graph of h4. (For determinay, we
shall onsider the setup in Figure 5.3, when E˜ is below the line p2 = p1+ρ, i.e. ∆p > −ρ.)
Also, it is easy to verify that for initial data (p¯01, p¯
0
2) in zones III or I-1, the phase
trajetories for t → +∞ tend to E˜
(
Y1
q1
, Y2
q2
)
. In zone III the dierential equations system
for the pries has the form {
p˙i =
Yi
qi
− pi, i = 1, 2
pi(0) = p¯
0
i
and its solution is
pi(t) =
(
p¯0i −
Yi
qi
)
e−t +
Yi
qi
,
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whih makes the laim obvious.
For initial data in zone I-1 (again in the setup from Figure 5.3, i.e. for∆p ∈ [−ρ, ρ]), the
dierential system for the pries oinides with that for zone III, whih was just desribed.
To onlude, asymptoti stability does not in general hold even for the point E˜, regard-
less of the properties of initial data from the above desribed zones, for whih the solutions
of the system tend to E˜. This onlusion remains valid for other relations between the
quantities Yi/pi and the transportation osts ρ (see Figure 5.4). These observations explain
the eets under stohasti perturbations of the pries, obtained in setion 6.
6 Prie dynamis with stohasti shoks
The model studied here is deterministi and the agents are assumed to have omplete
information. Given that this model abstrats from many real-world ompliations, it would
be worthwhile to study its behaviour with respet to perturbations in some of the exogenous
variables. In this setion we look at the ase of adding shoks to the pries by means
of inorporating a nuisane stohasti proess in the dierential system desribing their
evolution.
Remark 6.1. Before proeeding to develop the setup for the main stohasti simulation,
we note that, heuristially, it seems plausible to expet that the stability properties of
the dynamial system from setion 5 will, in some sense, be preserved in the presene of
well-behaved stohasti disturbanes. In other words, if the shoks disturbing the system
are suiently regular, one may expet the deterministi omponent to dominate in the
stohasti dynamial system. This intuition an be illustrated graphially with the aid of
omputer simulations featuring a series of one-sided positive or negative stohasti shoks
on the pries. A representative outome of the simulations is shown in Figure 6.1. As the
gure shows, the one-sided disturbanes ause the equilibrium outome to drift along the
lous of xed points of the (deterministi) dierential system. Moreover, for appropriate
one-sided disturbanes and initial onditions, the equilibrium will drift toward the point E˜,
whih was shown in the previous setion to enjoy somewhat stronger stability properties
than the other xed points of the system. 
In the prie equation (5.6) in disrete time we an inorporate external random utu-
ations by inluding a noise variable ∆Wt:
∆pt
pt
= A(t)∆t + σ∆Wt∆t
Here σ > 0 is a oeient haraterizing the prie variability, ∆Wt are independent iden-
tially distributed random variables that follow the standard Gaussian distribution. If we
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Figure 6.1: Stability of the xed points of the dierential system under one-sided positive
(left-hand graph) and negative (right-hand graph) stohasti shoks.
rewrite the above equation as
(6.1) ∆pt = A(t)pt∆t + σpt∆Wt∆t,
under some regularity onditions, at the limit ∆t → 0, the solution of the dierene
equation (6.1) onverges strongly to the solution of the stohasti dierential equation
(SDE)
(6.2) dp(t) = A(t)p(t)dt+ σp(t)dWt,
where dWt is the Ito stohasti dierential (for more details, see [6, Theorem 9.6.2, p.
324℄).
We hoose a SDE of this type to govern the prie dynamis in ontinuous time. Let us
onsider a 2-dimensional Wiener proess W = (Wt, t ∈ [0, T ]) with omponents W
1
t and
W 2t whih are independent salar Wiener proesses with respet to a ommon family of
σ-algebras {At, t ∈ [0, T ]}. Aording to equation (5.8) we onstrut the following system
dp1t = Q1(p
1
t , p
2
t )p
1
tdt+ σ1p
1
tdW
1
t
dp2t = Q2(p
1
t , p
2
t )p
2
tdt+ σ2p
2
tdW
2
t
In a more ompat form
(6.3) dpt = a(pt)dt+ b(pt)dWt,
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where pt = (p
1
t , p
2
t ), a(pt) is a 2-dimensional vetor funtion a = (Q1(.)p
1
t , Q2(.)p
2
t )
′ : R2 →
R
2
and
b(pt) =
(
σ1p
1
t 0
0 σ2p
2
t
)
is a 2× 2 matrix funtion b(t) : R2 → R2×2. Some regularity onditions on a(x), b(x), and
the initial ondition pt0 should be imposed for the existene and uniqueness of a strong
solution of the SDE, meaning that the solution pt is a measurable funtional of pt0 and
the Wiener proess Wu, u ∈ [t0, t] (see Theorem 4.5.3 p. 131 and Theorem 4.5.6, p.
139 in [6℄). The lassial onditions given, for example, in [6℄ annot be applied in our
ase beause the funtion a(x) violates the Lipshitz ondition. There is a result due to
Zvonkin whih guarantees existene and uniqueness of a strong solution while imposing
weaker assumptions on a(x), see Theorem 6.13, p. 152 in [5℄. Aording to it, a strong
solution of the one-dimensional version of the SDE in (6.3) exists and is unique if a(x) is
a bounded funtion and b(x) is Lipshitz and bounded away from zero. While we are not
aware of a multi-dimensional extension of Zvonkin's theorem, we hypothesize that a similar
result holds. Under this hypothesis, a strong solution of our SDE exists and is unique.
We explore the sample paths of the solution in the phase spae employing the Euler
sheme to solve the stohasti dierential system numerially. Figures 6.2 and 6.3 illustrate
the behaviour of the stohasti dierential system for dierent starting values of the pries.
In a fashion similar to the deterministi ase, the sample path approahes a stationary point
depending on the initial ondition. If a stationary point has been reahed, the random
shoks perturb the system away from it in a small neighborhood of the stationary point.
The simulation studies illustrate that provided the sales σ1 and σ2 are small enough, the
solution remains in a small neighborhood of a stationary point.
Appendix
Here we sketh the proofs of Propositions 4.3-4.6. Although the proof of Proposition
4.2 is ontained in the main body of the paper, we will provide a sketh for it as well in
order to illustrate the expository style adopted in this appendix.
We remind the reader that we always start with initial pries pi,0. These dene, through
the lines ℓi, the zone in the inome spae partition that the point (Y1, Y2) belongs to. We
also assume that (α, β, γ, δ) is a NE. After determining the spei values of (α, β, γ, δ),
we hek to what extent nanial resoures have been used and perform the neessary
prie adjustments. This leads to shifts in the lines ℓi, thus redening the partition and
hanging the position of (Y1, Y2) with respet to the newly obtained zones. Ultimately, we
seek to nd the respetive p.e.s. Whenever the use of more preise notation is alled for,
we write ℓi,t, t = 0, 1, 2, . . . The urrent oordinates in the equations of the respetive lines
are denoted by (Y˜1, Y˜2).
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Figure 6.2: Behaviour of the dierential system under stohasti shoks for dierent initial
pries and parameterizations of the problem (1)
A.1 Sketh of the proof of Proposition 4.2 for zone III
1) q2 − δ ≤ 0
1-I-A
−−−→α = q1, β = 0
2-I-A
−−−→ γ = 0, δ = q2. We obtain NE (q1, 0, 0,q2).
2) 0 < q2 − δ ≤ Y1/p
′
2 −→ 1-II-A1 or 1-II-A2
- for 1-II-A1: α = q1
2-I-A
−−−→ δ = q2 (impossible in ase 2)),
- for 1-II-A2: q1−α > 0 - only for ∆p > ρ
(3,1) 2-II-A2
−−−−−−−→ for ∆p > −ρ: δ = q2 (impossible).
3) Y1/p
′
2 < q2 − δ
1-III-A
−−−−→ q1 − α > 0 only for ∆p > ρ
(3,1)
−−→ for ∆p > −ρ: 2-II-A1 (A2)
and 2-III-A −→ q2 − δ = 0, whih is impossible.
For the NE (q1, 0, 0, q2) obtained, the supply of goods is exhausted. If Yi = pi,0qi, i =
1, 2, the nanial resoures are also exhausted, i.e. we are at a p.e. pi,t ≡ pi,0, ∀t ≥ 0, i =
1, 2. If for some i, i = 1, 2, we have Yi > pi,0qi, the respetive prie pi,0 is adjusted to the
level pi,1, dened by the ondition Yi = pi,1qi. Thus, we reah a p.e. pi,t ≡ pi,1, ∀t ≥ 1.
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Figure 6.3: Behaviour of the dierential system under stohasti shoks for dierent initial
pries and parameterizations of the problem (2)
A.2 Sketh of the proof of Proposition 4.3 for zone II
A.2.1 Zone II-3 (see (4.15))
1) q2 − δ ≤ 0
1-I-B
−−−→ α = Y1/p1(< q1), β = 0 −→ 1a) or 1b)
1a) 0 < q1−α < Y2/p
′
1
2-II-A1−−−−→ γ = q1−α, δ = q2. We getNE (Y1/p1, 0,q1 −Y1/p1,q2).
1b) Y2/p
′
1 < q1 − α, whih is impossible, sine for α = Y1/p1 we obtain that (Y1, Y2) is
below ℓ1 and so below ℓ4.
2) 0 < q2− δ ≤ Y1/p
′
2
1-II-B
−−−→
{
∆p ≤ ρ : α = Y1/p1(< q1), β = 0
∆p > ρ : α =
Y1−p′2(q2−δ)
p1
(< q1), β = q2 − δ
}
−→ 2a)
or 2b)
2a) 0 < q1 − α ≤ Y2/p
′
1
- for 2-II-A1: δ = q2, whih is impossible in ase 2).
- for 2-II-A2: i) or ii)
i) for ∆p ≥ −ρ (ases (1,1), (1,2), (2,1), (3,1)) −→ δ = q2, whih is impossible.
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ii) for ∆p < −ρ (ase (1,3)) −→ δ =
Y2−p′1
“
q1−
Y1
p1
”
p2
whih implies, in view of the rst
inequality in 2), that (Y1, Y2) is stritly below ℓ4.
2b) Y2/p
′
1 < q1 − α
2-III-A
−−−−→ i) or ii)
i) for ∆p ≥ −ρ: δ = q2  impossible in 2)
ii) for ∆p < −ρ: ase (1,3), whih is impossible, sine inequality 2b) for α = Y1/p1
implies that (Y1, Y2) is below ℓ1.
3) Y1/p
′
2 < q2 − δ
1-III-B
−−−−→
{
∆p ≤ ρ : α = Y1/p1, β = 0
∆p > ρ : α = 0, β = Y1/p
′
2
}
−→ 3a) or 3b)
3a) 0 < q1 − α ≤ Y2/p
′
1  impossible, see 2a)
3b) Y2/p
′
1 < q1 − α  impossible, see 2b)
For the unique NE, obtained in 1a), the quantities q1, q2 and Y1 are exhausted. The
ondition that (Y1, Y2) is above ℓ4, i.e.
(A.2.1) p′1,0
(
q1 −
Y1
p1,0
)
+ p2,0q2 ≤ Y2
leads to two ases.
Case I. The ondition (A.2.1) holds with equality. Then p2,0 also remains unhanged,
i.e. the points on ℓ4 in zone II are p.e.s.
Case II. If there is a strit inequality in (A.2.1), then
Y res2 = Y2 − p
′
1,0
(
q1 −
Y1
p1,0
)
> p2,0q2.
We inrease p2,0 to p2,1, for whih p2,1q2 = Y
res
2 . With the new pries p1,1 = p1,0 and p2,1,
the point (Y1, Y2) falls on the line
ℓ4,1 : p2,1q2 + p
′
1,0q1 = Y˜2 +
p′1,0
p1,0
Y˜1,
i.e. the p.e. is reahed in one adjustment step.
A.2.2 Zone II-2 (see (4.14))
1) q2 − δ ≤ 0
1-I-B
−−−→ α = Y1/p1(< q1), β = 0 −→ 1a) or 1b)
1a) 0 < q1 − α ≤ Y2/p
′
1
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- ase 2-II-A1 is impossible, sine (Y1, Y2) is below ℓ4
- ase 2-II-A2 −→ i) or ii)
i) for ∆p ≥ −ρ: γ = Y2−p2q2
p′
1
, δ = q2, whih leads for ∆p ≥ −ρ to
NE
(
Y1
p1
, 0,
Y2 − p2q2
p′1
,q2
)
.
ii) for ∆p < −ρ −→ δ < q2, whih is impossible in 1).
1b) q1 − α > Y2/p
′
1, whih is impossible for α = Y1/p1.
2) 0 < q2 − δ ≤ Y1/p
′
2
1-II-B
−−−→
{
∆p ≤ ρ : α = Y1/p1(< q1), β = 0
∆p > ρ : α =
Y1−p′2(q2−δ)
p1
(< q1), β = q2 − δ
}
−→ 2a)
or 2b)
2a) 0 < q1 − α ≤ Y2/p
′
1
- ase 2-II-A1: δ = q2, whih is impossible in 2)
- ase 2-II-A2 −→ i) or ii)
i) for ∆p ≥ −ρ −→ δ = q2, whih is impossible in 2)
ii) for ∆p < −ρ: only (1,3) −→ We have
NE
(
Y1
p1
, 0,q1 −
Y1
p1
,
Y2 − p
′
1(q1 −Y1/p1)
p2
)
.
(In this ase the ondition δ < q2 is obviously satised. A omment on the seond ondition,
q2 − δ ≤ Y2/p
′
1, is oered following ase 3a).)
2b) Y2/p
′
1 < q1 − α −→ i) or ii)
i) for α = Y1/p1 (i.e. for ∆p ≤ ρ): (Y1, Y2) is stritly below ℓ1, whih is impossible.
ii) for ∆p > ρ: only (3,1)
2-III-A
−−−−→ δ = q2, whih is impossible in 2).
3) Y1/p
′
2 < q2 − δ
1-III-B
−−−−→
{
∆p ≤ ρ : α = Y1/p1(< q1), β = 0
∆p > ρ : α = 0(< q1), β = Y1/p
′
2
}
−→ 3a) or 3b)
3a) 0 < q1 − α ≤ Y2/p
′
1 −→ i) or ii)
i) for 2-II-A1: δ = q2  impossible in 3)
ii) for 2-II-A2 −→ ∆p ≥ −ρ or ∆p < −ρ
- for ∆p ≥ −ρ: δ = q2  impossible
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- for ∆p < −ρ: only (1,3) −→ γ = q1 − Y1/p1, δ =
Y2−p′1(q1−Y1/p1)
p2
, whih leads to the
same NE as in ase 2a)-(1,3).
(It turns out that whether q2 − δ is greater than or less than Y1/p
′
2 is irrelevant, sine we
obtain the same NE.)
3b) Y2/p
′
1 < q1 − α
2-III-A
−−−−→ ase ∆p ≥ −ρ or ase ∆p < −ρ
- ase ∆p ≥ −ρ: δ = q2  impossible
- ase ∆p < −ρ: only (1,3) −→ ondition 3b) would imply that (Y1, Y2) is below ℓ1,
whih is impossible.
We now turn to the study of the prie dynamis, starting from the NE obtained above.
I) Analysis of the ase NE
(
Y1
p1,0
, 0,q1 −
Y1
p1,0
,
Y2−p
′
1,0(q1−Y1/p1,0)
p2,0
)
(see 2a) or 3a)
for ∆p < −ρ)
The quantities Y1, q1 and Y2 are depleted. Sine (Y1, Y2) is stritly below ℓ4, we have
δ < q2, i.e. q2 is not used up ompletely. Additionally,
(A.2.2) qcons2,0 = δ =
1
p2,0
[
Y2 +
p′1,0
p1,0
Y1 − p
′
1,0q1
]
≥ 0,
sine (Y1, Y2) is on or above ℓ1.
Case I,i): In (A.2.2) we have qcons2,0 > 0, i.e. (Y1, Y2) is stritly above ℓ1. Now p2,0
dereases to p2,1, whih is dened by
p2,1q2 = p2,0q
cons
2,0 = Y2 − p
′
1,0
(
q1 −
Y1
p1,0
)
.
Sine p1,1 = p1,0, the point (Y1, Y2) turns out to be on the line ℓ4,1, whih is parallel to ℓ4,0,
whose points are all equilibria, i.e. we reah a p.e. in one adjustment step.
The above ase is graphially illustrated in Figure A.1.
Case I,ii): In (A.2.2) we have qcons2,0 = 0, whih is possible for the points in ℓ1,0
⋂
{Zone II},
where q1 − Y1/p1,0 = Y2/p
′
1,0. Consequently, p2,0 is redued to p2,1 = 0 (while p1,1 = p1,0)
and we reah a degenerate ase. Writing for brevity (p1, 0) instead of (p1,1, p2,1), this ase
is desribed by Table 3.1 for p′2 = ρ, p1 > 0, and Table 3.4. We now have the problem of
nding NE (α, β, γ, δ) subjet to the onstraints
(A.2.3) 0 < Y1 < p1q1, 0 < Y2
and the additional ondition
(A.2.4)
Y1
p1
+
Y2
p′1
= q1.
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Figure A.1: Prie adjustment in ase I,i).
We solve the problem through the already familiar approah:
1) q2 − δ ≤ 0
1-I-B
−−−→ α = Y1/p1(< q1), β = 0 −→ 1a) or 1b)
1a) 0 < q1 − α = Y2/p
′
1
4-II
−−→ γ = q1 − α, δ = q2.
This leads to NE
(
Y1
p1
, 0,q1 −
Y1
p1
,q2
)
=
(
Y1
p1,0
, 0, Y2
p′1,0
,q2
)
Sine all resoures are depleted, we reah a degenerate p.e., for whih
p1,t = p1,0, p2,t = 0, ∀t ≥ 1.
Obviously only the rst eonomy is fully funtioning, while in the seond eonomy loal
output beomes irrelevant as its market prie is zero.
1b) Y2/p
′
1 < q1 − α, whih is impossible sine (Y1, Y2) is above ℓ1.
In the degenerate ase there are no other NE, sine for all possible ases, namely
2) 0 < q2 − δ ≤ Y1/ρ
or
3) Y1/ρ < q2 − δ,
after applying Table 3.4, we obtain δ = q2, whih leads to a ontradition.
This ompletes the analysis of ase I).
II) Analysis of the ase NE
(
Y1
p1,0
, 0, Y2−p2,0q2
p′1,0
,q2
)
(see 1a) for ∆p ≥ −ρ)
The quantities Y1, Y2 and q2 are depleted and the ondition that (Y1, Y2) is below ℓ4 is
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equivalent to
q1 >
[
Y1
p1,0
+
1
p′1,0
(Y2 − p2,0q2)
]
= qcons1,0 ,
i.e. q1 is not depleted. At the same time,
qcons1,0 =
Y1
p1,0
+
Y2
p′1,0
−
p2,0q2
p′1,0
≥ q1 −
p2,0q2
p′1,0
=
ρq1 + p1,0q1 − p2,0q2
p′1,0
> 0
aording to (4.1). Consequently, p1,0 is redued to p1,1, where
(A.2.5) p1,1q1 = p1,0q
cons
1,0 = Y1 +
p1,0
p′1,0
(Y2 − p2,0q2) .
The following subases are possible:
II,i) Y2 = p2,0q2, i.e. (Y1, Y2) is a point on the segment FE0 in Figure A.1. Now the
NE under onsideration takes the form (Y1/p1, 0, 0, q2). After the above adjustment of p1,0,
(Y1, Y2) turns out to be at E1, i.e. we reah a p.e. for whih
p1,t = p1,1, p2,t = p2,0, ∀t ≥ 1.
II,ii) Y2 > p2,0q2. First we nd the loation of (Y1, Y2) with respet to the new position
of ℓ4,0 (after the adjustment (A.2.5)) i.e. with respet to
ℓ4,1 : p2,0q2 + p
′
1,1q1 =
p′1,1
p1,1
Y˜1 + Y˜2.
We ompare p2,0q2 − Y2 and
p′1,1
p1,1
(Y1 − p1,1q1) =
p′1,1
p1,1
[
Y1 − Y1 −
p1,0
p′1,0
(Y2 − p2,0q2)
]
= (p2,0q2 − Y2)
p′1,1
p1,1
p1,0
p′1,0
.
Sine p1,1 = p1,0 −∆, ∆ > 0, it is easy to hek that
p′1,1
p1,1
p1,0
p′1,0
> 1,
whih, after multipliation by p2,0q2 − Y2(< 0), yields
p2,0q2 − Y2 >
p′1,1
p1,1
(Y1 − p1,1q1).
Consequently, (Y1, Y2) turns out to be below ℓ4,1.
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The results obtained are illustrated graphially in Figure A.2. Let ℓ˜ denote a line
through the point (Y1, Y2), whih is parallel to ℓ4,0, i.e.
ℓ˜ :
p′1,0
p1,0
Y˜1 + Y˜2 = const
(
=
p′1,0Y1
p1,0
+ Y2
)
.
Obviously, the point M(p1,1q1, p2,0q2) lies on ℓ˜, as well as on ℓ4,1. Also, sine
tan θ0 =
p′1,0
p1,0
<
p′1,1
p1,1
= tan θ1,
it follows that
θ0 < θ1.
Thus, the line ℓ4,1 must turn in the negative diretion around the point M to oinide
with ℓ˜. Sine (Y1, Y2) lies on ℓ˜, it is loated below ℓ4,1. At the same time, as ℓ1,1 is below
ℓ1,0, the point (Y1, Y2) remains above ℓ1,1.
Y˜1
Y˜2
E0p2,0q2
p1,0q1
ℓ1,0
ℓ4,0
ℓ4,1
(Y1, Y2)
M
p′1,1q1
p′1,0q1
θ1
θ0
θ0
ℓ˜
ℓ1,1
N(p1,1q1, 0)
Figure A.2: Prie adjustment in ase II,ii)
Obviously, p′1,1 < p
′
1,0 and p2,0q2 < p
′
1,0q1, yet it is possible for p
′
1,1q1 to be greater or
smaller than p2,0q2 (see below).
We shall study separately the ases
II,ii-1) ∆p = −ρ, i.e. p′1,0 = p2,0,
II,ii-2) ∆p > −ρ, i.e. p′1,0 > p2,0.
In ase II,ii-1), after a downward adjustment of p1,0 to p1,1 (see (A.2.5)) we obtain
(in the new zone II-2  see Figure A.2, between ℓ4,1 and ℓ1,1) the ase leading to NE for
∆p < −ρ of the type in ase I,i). Consequently, after an adjustment of p2,1 = p2,0 to a
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smaller positive value p2,2, the point (Y1, Y2) lies on ℓ4,2, whose points are equilibria. Note
also that even if (Y1, Y2) ∈ ℓ1,0, this point will be stritly above ℓ1,1 and so a degenerate
equilibrium annot be obtained.
In ase II,ii-2) there are many possibilities, whih we desribe below. Suppose that,
after the rst adjustment of p1,0 as per (A.2.5) down to p1,1, we obtain the ondition
∆p ≤ −ρ, i.e. p′1,1 ≤ p2,1. (We have p2,1 = p2,0, sine only p1,0 has been hanged.) Then,
when onsumption in the next period is arried out (t = 2), the above desribed adjustment
aording to the NE of type I,i) obtains.
To nd out whether suh points exist at all, we write the ondition (whih is the
onverse of the one mentioned above)
(A.2.6) p′1,1 > p2,0
in the equivalent form
(A.2.7) Y1 +
p1,0
p′1,0
Y2 > (p2,0 − ρ)q1 +
p1,0
p′1,0
p2,0q2.
Consequently, the ondition (A.2.6) means that the point (Y1, Y2) is above the line
ℓ¯ : Y˜1 +
p1,0
p′1,0
Y˜2 = (p2,0 − ρ)q1 +
p1,0
p′1,0
p2,0q2,
whih is parallel to ℓ4,0 and ℓ1,0. Sine the absissa of the intersetion point of ℓ¯ with the Y˜1
axis is smaller than the absissa of the intersetion point of ℓ4,0 (in view of II,ii-2)), there
exist points (Y1, Y2) in zone II-2 with the property (A.2.6). Respetively, in the ase when
(A.2.6) does not hold, the relevant points belong to the losed area in zone II-2 enlosed
between ℓ1,0 and ℓ¯ (when ℓ¯ is between ℓ1,0 and ℓ4,0), or the segment of ℓ1,0 = ℓ¯ belonging
to zone II-2 (when the last two line oinide), and for then the adjustment proess from
II,ii-1) obtains. When ℓ¯ is stritly below ℓ1,0, no suh points exist.
For all points stritly above ℓ¯ the onditions
p′1,0 > p2,0 and p
′
1,1 > p2,0
are simultaneously valid.
Figure A.3 illustrates this ase, with ℓ¯ taken to lie between ℓ1,0 and ℓ4,0 for determinay.
In the new zone II-2, dened by ℓ1,1 and ℓ4,1, we again obtain a NE of type II. However,
beause of the rotation at an angle θ1 − θ0 in the negative diretion (see above), it is not
ertain whether after the adjustment in p1,1 (in whih a redution to p1,2 ours), we an
have
(A.2.8) p′1,2 > p2,2 (= p2,0),
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Y˜1
Y˜2
E0p2,0q2
p1,0q1
S
ℓ1,0
ℓ4,0
ℓ4,1
(Y1, Y2)
T
M
ℓ¯new ℓ¯
ℓ˜
θ0
θ1
Figure A.3: Prie adjustment in ase II,ii-2)
i.e. whether (Y1, Y2) would be above ℓ¯new (see Figure A.3).
To desribe all possible ases, we introdue the funtion
(A.2.9) g(x) =
1
q1
[
Y1 + (Y2 − p2,0q2)
x
x+ ρ
]
,
for whih g(0) > 0, g′(x) > 0, limx→∞ g(x) > g(0) > 0 (see Figure A.4).
g(x)
xk
k
g(+∞)
g(0)
45◦
Figure A.4: The funtion g(x)
With the aid of the funtion g(x), the ondition that the point (Y1, Y2) is below the line
ℓ4,0 beomes equivalent to
(A.2.10) p1,0 > g(p1,0).
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This, in partiular, implies that p1,0 > k, where k is the only positive number dened by
k = g(k).
Respetively, the ondition (A.2.5) determining p1,1 an be written as
(A.2.11) p1,1 = g(p1,0).
If (A.2.8) were valid, in the next step we would set
p1,2 = g(p1,1) = g
2(p1,0)
and so on.
There are two possible ases:
II,ii-2a): p2,0 − ρ ≤ k(< p1,0),
II,ii-2b): k < p2,0 − ρ (< p1,0).
Case II,ii-2a). In this ase
p1,1 = g(p1,0) > g(k) = k ≥ p2 − ρ.
We reah a NE of the type II,ii) and set
p1,2 = g(p1,1) > k ≥ p2 − ρ
et.
p1,t+1 = g(p1,t), ∀t > 0.
Obviously the sequene {p1,t} is onvergent and tends to k. The points S, T and M in
Figure A.3 have absissas respetively (p2,0 − ρ)q1, kq1 and p1,1q1, and the line through T
and (Y1, Y2) is the limit position of ℓ4 after innitely many adjustments of the rst prie.
Case II,ii-2b). Let
p2,0 − ρ ∈ [g
s(p1,0), g
s−1(p1,0)],
where s is a natural number. In this ase, after s adjustments of the rst prie, we reah
an equilibrium for whih the respetive NE is of type I) and the prie adjustment proess
evolves aordingly.
Remark A.2.1. It is possible, as a result of the prie redution in the rst market, to
reah for some t ∈ N the situation
p′1,t ≤ p2,0q2,
i.e. zone II-1 disappears. (As a matter of fat, this is the ase of zone IV-2, with the
roles of the two eonomies reversed.) We an diretly see that if p′1,0q1 ≤ p2,0q2, in the
expanded zone II-2 {
Y1 < p1q1, Y2 ≥ p2q2
(Y1, Y2) is strily below ℓ4
one obtains the NEs of type I) and II) derived above. The only qualitative dierene here
is that no degenerate equilibria exist. 
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A.2.3 Zone II-1 (see (4.13))
We note that this zone is haraterized by relatively low nanial resoures in both
eonomies. We have Y1 < Y0, where the point (Y0, p2q2) = ℓ1
⋂
{Y˜2 = p2q2} and Y2 < p
′
1q1.
To nd the NE one proeeds as follows.
1) q2 − δ ≤ 0
1-I-B
−−−→ α = Y1/p1(< q1), β = 0 −→ 1a) or 1b)
1a) 0 < q1 − α ≤ Y2/p
′
1 is impossible, sine for α = Y1/p1 the point (Y1, Y2) would be
above ℓ1.
1b) Y2/p
′
1 < q1 − α
2-III-A
−−−−→ i) or ii)
i) for ∆p ≥ −ρ: γ = Y2−p2q2
p′
1
, δ = q2, whih leads to the NE
(
Y1
p1
, 0, Y2−p1q2
p′1
,q2
)
.
ii) for ∆p < −ρ −→ δ = 0 −→ q2 − δ > 0, whih is impossible in 1).
2) 0 < q2−δ ≤ Y1/p
′
2
1-III-B
−−−−→
{
∆p ≤ ρ : α = Y1
p1
(< q1), β = 0
∆p > ρ : α =
Y1−p′2(q2−δ)
p1
(< q1), β = q2 − δ
}
−→ 2a)
or 2b)
2a) 0 < q1 − α ≤ Y2/p
′
1
- for ∆p ≤ ρ: impossible (see 1a))
- for ∆p > ρ: only (3,1) −→ 2-II-A1 and 2-II-A2 (∆p > −ρ) −→ δ = q2  impossible.
2b) q1 − α > Y2/p
′
1
2-III-A
−−−−→ ase ∆p ≥ −ρ or ase ∆p < −ρ
- for ∆p ≥ −ρ: δ = q2  impossible.
- for ∆p < −ρ: only in (1,3), γ = Y2/p
′
1, δ = 0, whih leads to the NE
(
Y1
p1
, 0, Y2
p′
1
, 0
)
.
(See the omment after 3b) for a hek of the ondition q2 − 0 ≤ Y1/p
′
2.)
3) Y1/p
′
2 < q2 − δ
1-III-B
−−−−→
{
∆p ≤ ρ : α = Y1/p1(< q1), β = 0
∆p > ρ : α = 0(< q1), β = Y2/p
′
2
}
−→ 3a) or 3b)
3a) 0 < q1 − α ≤ Y2/p
′
1
- for ∆p ≤ ρ  impossible (see 1a))
- for ∆p > ρ  impossible (see 1a))
3b) q1 − α > Y2/p
′
1
2-III-A
−−−−→ ase ∆p ≥ −ρ or ase ∆p < −ρ
- for ∆p ≥ −ρ: δ = q2  impossible
- for ∆p < −ρ: only in (1,3), γ = Y2/p
′
1, δ = 0, whih leads to the same NE as in 2b).
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(It follows that the hek whether Y1/p
′
2 is less than or greater than q2 is unneessary.)
We now turn to the study of the prie dynamis, starting from the NE obtained above.
I) Analysis of the ase NE
(
Y1
p1,0
, 0, Y2
p′1,0
, 0
)
for ∆p < −ρ (see 2a) or 3b))
The nanial resoures Yi are depleted, q1 is only onsumed in part (sine (Y1, Y2) is
stritly below ℓ1 and thus q
cons
1,0 ∈ (0, q1)) and q2 is unhanged (q
cons
2,0 = 0). Consequently,
p2,1 = 0 and p1,1 < p1,0 is determined by
p1,1q1 = p1,0q
cons
1,0 = Y1 +
p1,0
p′1,0
Y2.
It is immediately seen that the point (Y1, Y2) remains below the line
ℓ1,1 : p1,1q1 = Y˜1 + p1,1
Y˜2
p′1,1
and (omitting the index t = 1) this point lies in the following set (degenerate zone II-1):
(A.2.12)
{ Y1
p1
+ Y2
p′
1
< q1,
0 < Y1 < p1q1, 0 < Y2.
Figure A.5 provides a geometri illustration of the adjustment of the line ℓ1 in the ase
when the prie p1 is redued.
Y˜1
Y˜2
ℓ1,0
(p1,0q1, 0)K
ℓ1,1
(Y1, Y2)
ℓ˜
θ1
θ2
Figure A.5: The adjustment of the line ℓ1 when p1 is redued
The line ℓ˜, passing through the point (Y1, Y2), is parallel to ℓ1,0 and has the equation
ℓ˜ : Y˜1 +
p1,0
p′1,0
Y˜2 = Y1 +
p1,0
p′1,0
Y2 = p1,1q1.
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It intersets the line
ℓ1,1 : Y˜1 +
p1,1
p′1,1
Y˜2 = p1,1q1
at the point K(p1,1q1). Sine (see Figure A.5 for the notation)
tan θ1 =
p′1,0
p1,0
<
p′1,1
p1,1
= tan θ2 ⇒ θ1 < θ2,
it is obvious that (Y1, Y2) is below ℓ1,1.
Using Table 3.1 (for p′2 = ρ and p1 > 0) and Table 3.4, we nd the NE
(
Y1
p1,0
, 0, Y2
p′1,0
, 0
)
for the set dened in (A.2.12). For this NE, Y1, Y2 and q2 are depleted, so the prie
p1 (= p1,1) is redued, as above, to p1,2 = h(p1,1) ≡
1
q1
[
Y1 +
p1,1
p1,1+ρ
Y2
]
.
This adjustment proess for the prie is innite and in the limit we reah
p1,∞ = lim
t→∞
p1,t,
where p1,∞ is the positive solution of the equation k = h(k). In general, the pries tend to
(although they never reah it) a degenerate equilibrium
p1,t → p1,∞, p2,t = 0, ∀t ≥ 0.
In this situation, the limiting position of (Y1, Y2) is on the line
(A.2.13) ℓ1,∞ :
Y˜1
p1,∞
+
Y˜2
p′1,∞
= q1.
From this one an easily obtain the number
(A.2.14) p1,∞ =
1
2q1
(
Y1 + Y2 − ρq1 +
√
(Y1 + Y2 − ρq1)2 + 4ρq1Y1
)
.
Returning to the situation shown in Figure A.5, we note that in the adjustment proess
for p1 desribed above, the points (p1,tq1, 0), whih are ounterparts to the point K, tend
to the limit point (p1,∞q1, 0), while the lines ℓ1,t onverge to the limit position ℓ1,∞ (with
the latter line passing through (Y1, Y2)).
II) Analysis of the ase NE
(
Y1
p1,0
, 0,
Y2−p2,0q2
p′1,0
,q2
)
for ∆p ≥ −ρ (see 1b))
The analysis and results in this ase oinide with those for ase II) from b) from
Proposition 4.3 (when the onstraint oming from ℓ1 is not binding).
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A.3 Sketh of the proof of Proposition 4.4 for zone I
The nanial resoures are smaller than the supply in both eonomies, whih tehnially
means that we shall use parts B in Tables 3.1 and 3.2. For the same reason, the relationship
between initial pries and transportation osts plays an important role for the evolution of
pries here.
A.3.1 Zone I-1 (see (4.17))
1) q2 − δ ≤ 0
1-I-B
−−−→ α = Y1/p1(< q1), β = 0 −→ 1a) or 1b)
1a) 0 < q1 − α ≤ Y2/p
′
1
2-II-B
−−−→ q2 − δ ≥ q2 − Y2/p2 > 0, whih is impossible in 1).
1b) Y2/p
′
1 < q1 − α  impossible for α = Y1/p1, sine it would imply that (Y1, Y2) is
stritly below ℓ1.
2) 0 < q2− δ ≤ Y2/p
′
2
1-II-B
−−−→
{
∆p ≤ ρ : α = Y1/p1(< q1), β = 0
∆p > ρ : α =
Y1−p′2(q2−δ)
p1
(< q1), β = q2 − δ
}
−→ 2a)
or 2b)
2a) 0 < q1 − α ≤ Y2/p
′
1
2-II-B
−−−→ i) or ii)
i) for ∆p ≥ −ρ: γ = 0, δ = Y2/p2
ii) for ∆p < −ρ: γ = q1 − α, δ =
Y2−p′1(q1−α)
p2
We obtain respetively:
- in ases (1,1), (1,2) and (2,1), i.e. for ∆p ∈ [−ρ, ρ]: NE
(
Y1
p1
, 0, 0, Y2
p2
)
- in ase (1,3), ∆p < −ρ: NE
(
Y1
p1
, 0,q1 −
Y1
p1
,
Y2−p
′
1
“
q1−
Y1
p1
”
p2
)
- in ase (3,1), ∆p > ρ: NE
(
Y1−p
′
2
“
q2−
Y2
p2
”
p1
,q2 −
Y2
p2
, 0, Y2
p2
)
.
(The ondition from 2) holds for δ = Y2/p2, sine (Y1, Y2) is above ℓ2. For a hek of
the ondition when δ is as in the NE for ∆p < −ρ, see 3a). The ondition q1 ≤ α− Y2/p
′
1
holds for α = Y1/p1, sine (Y1, Y2) is above ℓ1. For a hek of the ondition when α is as
in the NE for ∆p > ρ, see 2b).)
2b) Y2/p
′
1 < q1 − α  impossible for α = Y1/p1, sine (Y1, Y2) is above ℓ1 −→ we have
only ase (3,1): ∆p > ρ, for whih we nd the same NE as in the respetive ase in 2a).
Therefore, it is unneessary to ompare q1 and α+ Y2/p
′
1.
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3) Y1/p
′
2 < q2 − δ
1-III-B
−−−−→
{
∆p ≤ ρ : α = Y1/p1(< q1), β = 0
∆p > ρ : α = 0(< q1), β = Y1/p
′
2
}
−→ 3a) or 3b)
3a) 0 < q1 − α ≤ Y2/p
′
1
- for ∆p ≤ ρ  impossible, sine δ = Y2/p2 will violate the ondition that (Y1, Y2) is
above ℓ2.
- we have only (1,3) for ∆p < −ρ, in whih ase we again arrive at the NE from 2a).
(It follows that it is unneessary to ompare Y1/p
′
2 and q2 − δ.)
3b) q1 − α > Y2/p
′
1
- for ∆p ≤ ρ  impossible, sine (Y1, Y2) is above ℓ1
- for ∆p > ρ: only in (3,1)
2-III-B
−−−−→ δ = Y2/p2, whih is impossible (see 3a)).
I) Analysis of the ase NE
(
Y1
p1,0
, 0, 0, Y2
p2,0
)
for ∆p ∈ [−ρ, ρ] (see 2a))
Sine both quantities qi are not onsumed ompletely (q
cons
i,0 = Yi/pi < qi), the pries
are redued one to
pi,1 =
Yi
qi
.
Then the point (Y1, Y2) oinides with E1, the new position of the point E0, whih is a
p.e. (In a sense, the situation here is the exat opposite of that in zone III, where the new
point E1 is reahed after one upward adjustment.)
II) Analysis of the ase NE
(
Y1
p1,0
, 0,q1 −
Y1
p1,0
,
Y2−p
′
1,0
„
q1−
Y1
p1,0
«
p2,0
)
for ∆p < −ρ
(see 2a))
Obviously Y1, Y2 and q1 are depleted. Sine (Y1, Y2) is stritly below ℓ4,0,
qcons2,0 =
Y2 − p
′
1,0
(
q1 −
Y1
p1,0
)
p2,0
< q2.
Consequently, p2,0 is redued to p2,1:
(A.3.1) p2,1q2 = Y2 − p
′
1,0
(
q1 −
Y1
p1,0
)
.
II-1): p2,1 > 0, i.e. (Y1, Y2) is stritly above ℓ1,0. Sine p1,0 is unhanged, i.e. p1,1 = p1,0,
equation (A.3.1) shows that (Y1, Y2) lies on ℓ4,1. Moreover,
Y2 − p2,1q2 = Y2 −
[
Y2 − p
′
1,0
(
q1 −
Y1
p1,0
)]
> 0,
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i.e. (Y1, Y2) lies on the part of ℓ4,1 in the new zone II-3, whose points are p.e.s
II-2) p2,1 = 0, i.e. (Y1, Y2) lies on ℓ1,0. Thus, we reah a degenerate ase (p1 > 0, p2 = 0),
whih was analyzed for zone II-2, ase I-ii). It leads to a degenerate ℓ1-equilibrium:
p2,t = 0, ∀t ≥ 1.
III) Analysis of the ase NE
(
Y1−p
′
2,0
„
q2−
Y2
p2,0
«
p1,0
,q2 −
Y2
p2,0
, 0, Y2
p2,0
)
for ∆p > ρ
(see 2a))
The quantities Y1, Y2 and q2 are depleted, and q
cons
1,0 < q1, sine (Y1, Y2) is stritly below
the line ℓ3. After a redution of p1,0 to p1,1, where
p1,1q1 = Y1 − p
′
2,0
(
q2 −
Y2
p2,0
)
,
the point (Y1, Y2) lies on the new line ℓ3, whose points in zone IV are p.e.s.
A.3.2 Zone I-2 (see (4.18))
1) q2 − δ ≤ 0
1-I-B
−−−→ α = Y1/p1(< q1), β = 0 −→ 1a) or 1b)
1a) 0 < q1−α ≤ Y2/p
′
1  impossible, sine for α = Y1/p1 it ontradits the assumption
that (Y1, Y2) is stritly below ℓ1.
1b) Y2/p
′
1 < q1 − α
2-III-B
−−−−→ ase ∆p ≥ −ρ or ase ∆p < −ρ
- ase ∆p ≥ −ρ: δ = Y2/p2 < q2, whih ontradits 1).
- ase ∆p < −ρ: δ = 0, whih in 1) implies q2 ≤ 0 (impossible).
2) 0 < q2 − δ ≤ Y1/p
′
2
1-II-B
−−−→ for ∆p ≤ ρ: α = Y1/p1(< q1), β = 0 or, for ∆p > ρ:
α =
Y1−p′2(q2−δ)
p1
, β = q2 − δ −→ 2a) or 2b)
2a) 0 < q1 − α ≤ Y2/p
′
1, whih is impossible, sine it would imply, for α ≤ Y1/p1, that
(Y1, Y2) is above ℓ1.
2b) Y2/p
′
1 < q1 − α
2-III-B
−−−−→
{
∆p ≥ −ρ : γ = 0, δ = Y2/p2
∆p < −ρ : γ = Y2/p
′
1, δ = 0
}
−→ three alternatives:
- for ∆p ∈ [−ρ, ρ] (ases (1,1), (1,2) and (2,1)): NE
(
Y1
p1
, 0, 0, Y2
p2
)
;
- for ∆p < −ρ (ase (1,3)): NE
(
Y1
p1
, 0, Y2
p′1
, 0
)
;
- for ∆p > ρ (ase (3,1)): NE
(
Y2−p
′
2
“
q2−
Y2
p2
”
p1
,q2 −
Y2
p2
, 0, Y2
p2
)
.
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3) Y1/p
′
2 < q2 − δ
1-III-B
−−−−→
{
∆p ≤ ρ : α = Y1/p1(< q1), β = 0
∆p > ρ : α = 0, β = Y1/p
′
2
}
−→ 3a) or 3b)
3a) 0 < q1 − α ≤ Y2/p
′
1, whih is impossible (see 2a))
3b) Y2/p
′
1 < q1 − α
2-III-B
−−−−→ i) or ii)
i) for ∆p ≥ −ρ: δ = Y2/p2, whih is impossible, sine 3) implies that (Y1, Y2) is stritly
below ℓ2.
ii) for ∆p < −ρ, we only have ase (1,3): γ = Y2/p
′
1, δ = 0, whih leads to the NE
arising in 2b). (Therefore, a omparison of q2 and Y1/p
′
2 to hek the feasibility of the NE
is unneessary.)
I) Analysis of the ase NE
(
Y1
p1,0
, 0, 0, Y2
p2,0
)
for ∆p ∈ [−ρ, ρ] (see 2b))
This ase oinides with ase I) in the analysis of zone I-1.
II) Analysis of the ase NE
(
Y1
p1,0
, 0, Y2
p′1,0
, 0
)
for ∆p < −ρ (see 2b))
Here the nanial resoures are ompletely spent; qcons1,0 = Y1/p1,0 + Y2/p
′
1,0 < q1, sine
(Y1, Y2) is stritly below ℓ1,0, q
cons
2,0 = 0. Then, p1,0 adjusts downward to p1,1, where
p1,1q1 = Y1 +
p1,0
p′1,0
Y2,
while p2,0 is adjusted downwards to p2,1 = 0. It is immediately veried that (Y1, Y2) remains
stritly below the line
ℓ1,1 : p1,1q1 = Y˜1 +
p1,1
p′1,1
Y˜2.
Thus, we obtain a degenerate zone II-1.
III) Analysis of the ase NE
(
Y1−p
′
2,0
„
q2−
Y2
p2,0
«
p1,0
,q2 −
Y2
p2,0
, 0, Y2
p2,0
)
for ∆p > ρ
(see 2b))
See ase III) from zone I-1.
A.3.3 Zone I-3 (see (4.19))
1) q2 − δ ≤ 0
1-I-B
−−−→ α = Y1/p1(< q1), β = 0 −→ 1a) or 1b)
1a) 0 < q1 − α ≤ Y2/p
′
1  impossible, sine it ontradits the assumption that (Y1, Y2)
is stritly below ℓ2,0.
1b) Y2/p
′
1 < q1 − α
2-III-B
−−−−→ ase ∆p ≥ −ρ or ase ∆p < −ρ
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- ase ∆p ≥ −ρ: δ = Y2/p2 < q2, whih ontradits 1).
- ase ∆p < −ρ: δ = 0 < q2, whih is inompatible with 1).
2) 0 < q2 − δ ≤ Y1/p
′
2
1-II-B
−−−→
{
∆p ≤ ρ : α = Y1/p1(< q1), β = 0
∆p > ρ : α =
Y1−p′2(q2−δ)
p1
, β = q2 − δ
}
−→ 2a) or
2b)
2a) 0 < q1 − α ≤ Y2/p
′
1, whih is impossible, sine for α ≤ Y1/p1 it would imply that
(Y1, Y2) is above ℓ1.
2b) Y2/p
′
1 < q1 − α
2-III-B
−−−−→ δ = Y2/p2 or 0, and by the seond inequality in 2) it would
imply that (Y1, Y2) is above ℓ2, whih is impossible.
3) Y1/p
′
2 < q2 − δ
1-III-B
−−−−→
{
∆p ≤ ρ : α = Y1/p1(< q1), β = 0
∆p > ρ : α = 0(< q1), β = Y1/p
′
2
}
−→ 3a) or 3b)
3a) 0 < q1 − α ≤ Y2/p
′
1, whih is impossible (see 2a))
3b) Y2/p
′
1 < q1 − α
2-III-B
−−−−→ i) or ii)
i) for ∆p ≥ −ρ: γ = 0, δ = Y2/p2;
ii) for ∆p < −ρ: γ = Y2/p2, δ = 0.
From this we nd:
- for ∆p ∈ [−ρ, ρ] (ases (1,1), (1,2) and (1,3)): NE
(
Y1
p1
, 0, 0, Y2
p2
)
;
- for ∆p < −ρ (ase (1,3)): NE
(
Y1
p1
, 0, Y2
p′1
, 0
)
;
- for ∆p > ρ (ase (3,1)): NE
(
0, Y1
p′2
, 0, Y2
p2
)
.
I) Analysis of the ase NE
(
Y1
p1,0
, 0, 0, Y2
p2,0
)
for ∆p ∈ [−ρ, ρ]
See ase I) in the analysis of zone I-1.
II) Analysis of the ase NE
(
Y1
p1,0
, 0, Y2
p′
1,0
, 0
)
for ∆p < −ρ
See ase II) in the analysis of zone I-2.
III) Analysis of the ase NE
(
0, Y1
p′2,0
, 0, Y2
p2,0
)
for ∆p > ρ
This ase is symmetri (with respet to a hange of roles of the two eonomies) with
ase II). The nanial resoures Y1, Y2 are entirely spent, q
cons
2,0 = Y1/p
′
2+Y2/p2 < q2 (sine
(Y1, Y2) is stritly below ℓ2), and q1 is not onsumed at all. Consequently, p2,0 is redued
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to p2,1:
p2,1q2 =
p2,0
p′2,0
Y1 + Y2,
and p1,1 = 0. We thus reah a degenerate ase p1 = 0, p2 > 0:{
0 < Y1, 0 < Y2 < p2q2,
Y2 +
p2
p′
2
Y1 < q2.
In the standard way, using Tables 3.3 and 3.2 (for p′1 = ρ, p2 > 0), we nd the next NE(
q1,
Y1
p′
2
, 0, Y2
p2
)
. After that one obtains an innite prie adjustment proess for the prie p2,
{p2,t}, for whih
p2,t+1q2 =
p2,t
p′2,t
Y1 + Y2,
i.e. the system of two eonomies tends to a degenerate ℓ2-equilibrium.
A.4 Sketh of the proof of Proposition 4.5 for zone IV
A.4.1 Zone IV-1 (see (4.21))
1) q2 − δ ≤ 0
1-I-A
−−−→ α = q1
2-I-B
−−−→ δ = Y2/p2 < q2, whih is inompatible with 1).
2) 0 < q2 − δ ≤ Y1/p
′
2
- for 1-II-A1: α = q1, β = q2 − δ
2-I-B
−−−→ γ = 0, δ = Y2/p2, whih leads to
NE
(
q1,q2 −
Y2
p2
, 0, Y2
p2
)
. (The inequalities in 2) hold. In partiular, the seond one holds
sine (Y1, Y2) is above ℓ2.)
- for 1-II-A2: i) for ∆p ≤ ρ: α = q1, β =
Y1−p1q1
p′
2
;
ii) for ∆p > ρ: α =
Y1−p′2(q2−δ)
p1
, β = q2 − δ.
Then:
i)
2-I-B
−−−→ γ = 0, δ = Y2/p2. However, for this value of δ the ondition from 1-II-A2
together with the ondition that (Y1, Y2) is on or above ℓ3 yield q1 =
Y1−p′2(q2−Y2/p2)
p1
, i.e.
Y1−p1q1
p′
2
= q2 −
Y2
p2
, whih shows that in this ase we do not obtain a dierent NE from the
one above.
ii) −→ ii-1), ii-2) or ii-3)
ii-1) for q1 ≤ α
2-I-B
−−−→ γ = 0, δ = Y2/p2 and again the ondition 1-II-A2 and the
assumption that (Y1, Y2) is on or above ℓ3 imply α = q1, so that the familiar NE obtains.
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ii-2) for 0 < q1 − α ≤ Y2/p
′
2
2-II-B
−−−→ (only (3,1)) for ∆p > −ρ: γ = 0, δ = Y2/p2, whih
is impossible in view of the rst inequality in this ase (α < q1) and the ondition that
(Y1, Y2) is above ℓ3.
ii-3) for Y2/p
′
2 < q1 − α
2-III-B
−−−−→ (only (3,1)) δ = Y2/p2, whih is impossible in this ase
(see ii-2)).
3) Y1/p
′
2 < q2 − δ
1-III-A
−−−−→ i) or ii)
i) for ∆p ≤ ρ: α = q1, β =
Y1−p1q1
p′
2
ii) for ∆p > ρ: α = 0, β = Y1
p′
2
Respetively, we have:
i)
2-I-B
−−−→ γ = 0, δ = Y2/p2, whih is a ontradition, sine 3) would imply that (Y1, Y2)
is below ℓ2 (impossible in zone IV-1).
ii)
2-II-B and 2-III-B
−−−−−−−−−−→ (only (3,1)) γ = 0, δ = Y2/p2 (impossible, as just shown in i))
Analysis of the ase NE
(
q1,q2 −
Y2
p2,0
, 0, Y2
p2,0
)
The analysis and the results are symmetri (with respet to a hange of roles of the
two eonomies) to those for zone II-3.
A.4.2 Zone IV-2 (see (4.22))
1) q2 − δ ≤ 0
1-I-A
−−−→ α = q1, β = 0
2-I-B
−−−→ γ = 0, δ = Y2/p2, whih is inompatible with
1).
2) 0 < q2 − δ ≤ Y1/p
′
2 −→ i) or ii)
i) 1-II-A1 −→ α = q1, β = q2 − δ
2-I-B
−−−→ δ = Y2/p2, for whih the ondition from 1-II-A1
does not hold, sine (Y1, Y2) is below ℓ3.
ii) 1-II-A2 −→ ii-1) or ii-2)
ii-1) for ∆p ≤ ρ: α = q1, β =
Y1−p1q1
p′
2
2-I-B
−−−→ γ = 0, δ = Y2/p2 and for ∆p ≤ ρ we get
NE
(
q1,
Y1−p1q1
p′2
, 0, Y2
p2
)
.
ii-2) for ∆p > ρ: α =
Y1−p′2(q2−δ)
p1
, β = q2 − δ, so that:
- If q1 − α ≤ 0
2-I-B
−−−→ δ = Y2/p2, whih is impossible, sine (Y1, Y2) is stritly below ℓ3.
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- If 0 < q1 − α ≤ Y2/p
′
1
2-II-B
−−−→ for (3,1): γ = 0, δ = Y2/p2 and we obtain
NE
(
Y1−p
′
2
“
q2−
Y2
p2
”
p1
,q2 −
Y2
p2
, 0, Y2
p2
)
. (As the same NE arises under the assumption Y2/p
′
1 ≤
q1 − α (see 2-III-B for ∆p > −ρ), it is unneessary to ompare Y2/p
′
1 and q1 − α.)
3) Y1/p
′
2 < q2 − δ
1-III-A
−−−−→ i) or ii)
i) for ∆p ≤ ρ: α = q1, β =
Y1−p1q1
p′
2
 impossible, sine by 2-I-B we have γ = 0, δ = Y2/p2
and 3) would imply that (Y1, Y2) is below ℓ2.
ii) for ∆p > ρ: α = 0, β = Y1
p′
2
−→ q1 − α > 0:
- if q1 − α ≤ Y2/p
′
1
2-II-B
−−−→ (only (3,1)) γ = 0, δ = Y2/p2 and we obtain the same
ontradition from 3).
- if Y2/p
′
1 < q1−α
2-III-B
−−−−→ (only (3,1)) γ = 0, δ = Y2/p2 and 3) leads to a ontradition.
The analysis of the prie adjustment in zone IV is analogous to the one in
zone II-2, as the situations obtain are symmetri as regards a hange of roles of the two
eonomies.
A.5 Sketh of the proof of Proposition 4.6 for ase (4.4iii) and
zone I (1)
We rst note that under the assumption made, in zone IV one obtains the situation in
zone II that was disussed under the ondition (4.4i) (and, respetively, with interhanged
roles of the two eonomies).
In this ase zone 1 is divided into four subzones (see Figure A.6). (We draw the reader's
attention to the fat that we use Arabi numerals to denote the zone in the present setup.)
The ase p′2q2 = p1q1 is not qualitatively dierent from the ase (4.4i).
A.5.1 Zone 1-4 (see (4.26))
1) q2 − δ ≤ 0
1-I-B
−−−→ α = Y1/p1(< q1), β = 0 −→ 1a) or 1b)
1a) 0 < q1 − α ≤ Y2/p
′
1
2-II-B
−−−→ i) or ii)
i) for ∆p ≥ ρ: δ = Y2/p2 < q2 (inompatible with 1))
ii) for ∆p < ρ: δ =
Y2−p′1(q1−α)
p2
 impossible, sine for α = Y1/p1 1) implies that (Y1, Y2)
is above ℓ4.
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Y˜1p1q1
p2q2
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p′2q2
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1-1
G
ℓ4
ℓ1
ℓ2
Figure A.6: The inome spae partition featuring zone 1
1b) Y2/p
′
1 < q1 − α  impossible, sine for α = Y1/p1 one would get that (Y1, Y2) is
above ℓ1.
2) 0 < q2 − δ ≤ Y1/p
′
2
1-II-B
−−−→ i) or ii)
i) for ∆p ≤ ρ: α = Y1/p1(< q1), β = 0
ii) for ∆p > ρ: α =
Y1−p′2(q2−δ)
p1
(< q1), β = q2 − δ,
so we have 2a) or 2b)
2a) 0 < q1 − α ≤ Y2/p
′
1
2-II-B
−−−→ i) or ii)
i) for ∆p ≥ −ρ: γ = 0, δ = Y2/p2,
ii) for ∆p < −ρ: γ = q1 − α, δ =
Y2−p′1(q1−α)
p2
,
From this we nd:
- for ∆p ∈ [−ρ, ρ] (ases (1,1), (1,2) and (2,1)): NE
(
Y1
p1
, 0, 0, Y2
p2
)
;
- for ∆p > ρ (ase (3,1)): NE
(
Y1−p
′
2
“
q2−
Y2
p2
”
p1
,q2 −
Y2
p2
, 0, Y2
p2
)
.
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- for ∆p < −ρ (ase (1,3)): NE
(
Y1
p1
, 0,q1 −
Y1
p1
,
Y2−p
′
1
“
q1−
Y1
p1
”
p2
)
.
(For the above NEs onditions 2) and 2a) obviously hold. We present more details on
the feasibility of the NEs after the analysis of ases 2b) and 3).)
2b) Y2/p
′
1 < q1 − α, whih is impossible for α = Y1/p1, so that only ase (3,1) for
∆p > ρ is left. This ase (by 2-III-B) leads to γ = 0, δ = Y2/p2 and we nd the same NE
as in 2a). (Thus, it is not neessary to hek inequalities 2b) and the seond inequality in
2a).)
3) Y1/p
′
2 < q2 − δ
1-III-B
−−−−→ i) or ii)
i) for ∆p ≤ ρ: α = Y1/p1(< q1), β = 0
ii) for ∆p > ρ: α = 0(< q1), β = Y1/p
′
2, so that we have 3a) or 3b)
3a) 0 < q1 − α ≤ Y2/p
′
1, whih for ∆p ≥ −ρ (by 2-II-B) leads to δ = Y2/p2, so that 3)
is impossible, while for ∆p < −ρ (ase (1,3)), we obtain the same result as in 2a).
3b) Y2/p
′
1 < q1 − α, whih is impossible for α = Y1/p1 (as (Y1, Y2) is above ℓ1), so only
(3,1) is left and by 2-III-B we nd δ = Y2/p2, for whih 3) annot hold, as (Y1, Y2) is above
ℓ2.
The prie adjustment proess for the NEs in question is the same as in zone I-1 (basi
ase). The points on (ℓ1
⋃
ℓ2)
⋂
{zone1-4} lead to a degenerate equilibrium for whih one
of the pries beomes zero.
As a speial illustration for the point G we list the possible ases:
a) for ∆p < −ρ: the initial NE is
(
Y1
p1
, 0, q1 −
Y1
p1
, 0
)
and for pries p1 > 0, p2 = 0 we
reah the equilibrium
(
Y1
p1
, 0, q1 −
Y1
p1
, q2
)
,
b) for ∆p > ρ: the initial NE is
(
0, q2 −
Y2
p2
, 0, Y2
p2
)
and for pries p1 = 0, p2 > 0 we
reah the equilibrium
(
q1, q2 −
Y2
p2
, 0, Y2
p2
)
,
) for ∆p ∈ [−ρ, ρ]: the initial NE is
(
Y1
p1
, 0, 0, Y2
p2
)
and, after a downward adjustment
of both pries, we reah a regular equilibrium that oinides with the new position of the
point E0.
A.5.2 Zone 1-3 (see (4.25))
1) q2 − δ ≤ 0
1-I-B
−−−→ α = Y1/p1, β = 0 −→ 1a) or 1b)
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1a) 0 < q1 − α ≤ Y2/p
′
1, whih is impossible, sine (Y1, Y2) is below ℓ1.
1b) Y2/p
′
1 < q1 − α
2-III-B
−−−−→ δ ≤ Y2/p2, whih ontradits the assumption Y2 < p2q2.
2) 0 < q2 − δ ≤ Y1/p
′
2
1-II-B
−−−→ the same situation as in ase 2) for zone 1-4.
Here, however, the ase
2a) 0 < q1 − α ≤ Y2/p
′
1 is impossible, as α ≤ Y1/p1 −→ (Y1, Y2) is above ℓ1,
and in the ase
2b) Y2/p
′
1 < q1 − α by 2-III-B we nd
- for ∆p ∈ [−ρ, ρ]: NE
(
Y1
p1
, 0, 0, Y2
p2
)
;
- for ∆p > ρ: NE
(
Y1−p′1
“
q2−
Y2
p2
”
p2
, q2 −
Y2
p2
, 0, Y2
p2
)
, just as in the respetive subases from
2a) in zone 1-4;
- for ∆p < −ρ: NE
(
Y1
p1
, 0, Y2
p′
1
, 0
)
, whih is dierent from the equilibrium omputed in
2a) for zone 1-4.
3) Y1/p
′
2 < q2 − δ
1-III-B
−−−−→
{
∆p ≤ ρ : α = Y1/p1, β = 0
∆p > ρ : α = 0, β = Y1/p
′
2
}
−→ 3a) or 3b)
3a) 0 < q1 − α ≤ Y2/p
′
1, whih is impossible, sine it would imply either that (Y1, Y2)
is above ℓ1, or that (Y1, Y2) is below ℓ2, both of whih are wrong here.
3b) Y2/p
′
1 < q1 −α, for whih, after eliminating the impossible ases, we reah the NE
from 2b) for ∆p < −ρ.
The prie adjustment proess for ∆p ∈ [−ρ,+∞) is the same as in zone 1-4 (i.e. as in
the basi ase for zone I-1).
The prie adjustment proess for ∆p < −ρ with initial NE
(
Y1
p1
, 0, Y2
p′
1
, 0
)
is the same as
in the ounterpart ase for zone I-2 (basi ase).
A.5.3 Zone 1-2 (see (4.24))
1) q2 − δ ≤ 0
1-I-B
−−−→ α = Y1/p1(< q1), β = 0. In this ase neither
1a) 0 < q1 − α ≤ Y2/p
′
2, nor
1b) Y2/p
′
2 < q1 −α are possible, sine they ontradit the inequality Y2 < p2q2 (by 1))
or the ondition that (Y1, Y2) is above ℓ1.
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2) 0 < q2−δ < Y1/p
′
2
1-II-B
−−−→
{
∆p ≤ ρ : α = Y1/p1(< q1), β = 0
∆p > ρ : α =
Y1−p′2(q2−δ)
p1
, β = q2 − δ
}
−→ 2a) or 2b)
2a) 0 < q1 − α ≤ Y2/p
′
1
- for ∆p ≥ −ρ we obtain (by 2-II-B) δ = Y2/p2 whih, together with 2), implies that
(Y1, Y2) is above ℓ2, whih is impossible. Then we have only ase (1,3), where for∆p < −ρ
we nd NE
(
Y1
p1
, 0,q1 −
Y1
p1
,
Y2−p
′
1
“
q1−
Y1
p1
”
p2
)
.
2b) Y2/p
′
1 < q1−α  impossible, sine for α = Y1/p1 one obtains that (Y1, Y2) is above
ℓ1, and for (3,1) (by 2-III-B and the inequality 2)) one nds that (Y1, Y2) is above ℓ2.
3) Y1/p
′
2 < q2 − δ
1-III-B
−−−−→
{
∆p ≤ ρ : α = Y1/p1, β = 0
∆p > ρ : α = 0, β = Y1/p
′
2
}
−→ 3a) or 3b)
3a) 0 < q1 − α ≤ Y2/p
′
1
2-II-B
−−−→
{
∆p ≥ −ρ : γ = 0, δ = Y2/p2,
∆p < −ρ : γ = q1 − α, δ =
Y2−p′1(q1−α)
p2
We obtain:
- for ∆p ∈ [−ρ, ρ] (ases (1,1), (1,2) and (2,1)): NE
(
Y1
p1
, 0, 0, Y2
p2
)
;
- for ∆p < −ρ (ase (1,3)): NE
(
Y1
p1
, 0,q1 −
Y1
p1
,
Y2−p
′
1
“
q1−
Y1
p1
”
p2
)
;
- for ∆p > ρ (ase (3,1)): NE
(
0, Y1
p′
2
, 0, Y2
p2
)
.
3b) Y2/p
′
1 < q1 − α
2-III-B
−−−−→ (3,1): we reah the NE from 3a) for ∆p > ρ.
The prie adjustment proess for ∆p ∈ (−∞, ρ] is the same as in the re-
spetive ases from zones 1-4, while for ∆p > ρ it is as in the orresponding
ase from zone I-3 (basi ase).
A.5.4 Zone 1-1 (see (4.23))
In view of the denition of this zone, the analysis and the results obtained fully oinide
with those for the basi ase in zone I-3.
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